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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
 
Housing is an investment in Iowa’s communities and people. This report investigates the 
following questions:  
 
What impact does affordable housing have  
•  on neighborhoods?  
•  on local and state economies?  
•  on expanding and stabilizing Iowa’s labor force?  
•  on meeting social, individual and community needs?   
 
FINDINGS 
 
HOUSING’S IMPACT ON NEIGHBORHOODS 
• Larger family housing developments slowed neighboring property value appreciation 
in Polk County by 3.8% in the first year or two after developments were approved, 
but had no significant effect once developments were established (three to four years 
after approval). 
• Mixed-income, high-quality developments had no significant effect on neighboring 
values during the first year or two, but once developments were established, had 
significant positive effects on property values, increasing them on average by 8%.  
• Elderly housing developments increased neighboring property value appreciation by 
about 5% in the first year or two, but had no significant further effect.  
 
Many types of affordable housing developments can have positive effects on their 
surrounding neighbors; well-designed affordable housing can help to jump-start stagnant 
neighborhood housing markets. Where we observed negative effects, these effects were 
small and short-lived; affordable housing developments do not appear to endanger 
neighborhood quality of life.    
 
HOUSING’S IMPACT ON LOCAL AND STATE ECONOMIES 
• For every dollar spent on developing affordable housing, an additional $0.64 is 
produced elsewhere in Iowa’s economy. For every dollar earned by a construction 
worker on an affordable housing project, an additional $0.41 is earned by workers in 
other sectors. For every two jobs created by affordable housing development, an 
additional job is created elsewhere in the economy during construction.   
• Affordable housing also has longer-term economic impacts. Beyond the construction 
period, every dollar spent on operating the housing produces an additional $0.47 
elsewhere in Iowa’s economy. For every dollar earned by a person employed by 
housing developments, an additional $0.57 is earned by workers in other sectors. For 
every five jobs created by affordable housing operations, an additional job is created 
elsewhere in the economy.  
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• Local impacts are greater in larger, more diversified counties because they have the 
capacity to supply more of the goods and services a development requires.  
 
While housing is a domestic rather than an export sector, it makes an important 
contribution to local economies. Spending on affordable housing developments, where 
demand continues to exceed supply will help the construction sector weather future 
temporary downturns in the demand for market-rate housing.  
 
HOUSING’S IMPACT ON EXPANDING AND STABILIZING IOWA’S LABOR FORCE 
• Workforce housing, affordable to skilled entry-level workers, is in short supply in 
Johnson, Polk and Story counties. There may be localized shortages in parts of other 
metropolitan areas, especially in neighborhoods close to employment centers.  
• The search for affordable newer housing is driving many younger working 
households to locate in counties adjacent to metropolitan areas, increasing urban 
sprawl.  
• There appears to be an ample supply of housing affordable to median-earner workers 
in nonmetropolitan counties, but available housing is likely to be outdated and 
inadequate. New investment is difficult because construction or rehabilitation would 
cost more than market prices would justify.  
 
If Iowa is to attract the 150,000 additional skilled workers that it is projected to need by 
2012, adequate affordable workforce housing is essential. Different strategies are needed 
to address the two types of gaps we identify: the “affordability gap” in some of the 
metropolitan counties where high-skilled jobs are most likely to locate, and the “value 
gap” in the nonmetropolitan counties where traditional employment is likely to continue 
to dominate.  
 
HOUSING’S IMPACT ON MEETING SOCIAL, INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY NEEDS  
• Housing enriched with services, such as assisted-living services for the elderly or 
people with mental or physical disabilities, is a far more preferable approach to 
institutionalization for many. Residents benefit from a more independent living 
situation, while receiving help that would not be available in conventional housing. It 
is also more cost-effective to provide just the services individuals need, rather than 
the intensive services that institutions such as nursing homes provide.   
• In each of the communities we studied, tenants did not believe they had reasonable 
alternatives to the affordable housing they occupied. Safe, healthy housing is in short 
supply for those on limited incomes. Even for market-rate tenants in Castle on the 
Hill, decent quality rental options in the community were very limited.  
• Home ownership would be out of reach for the working families assisted by Iowa 
Valley Habitat for Humanity and other home ownership assistance providers across 
the state. Families are given the opportunity to prove themselves and to become 
permanent members of their communities. 
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• Adaptive reuse of historic structures for affordable or mixed-income housing can 
provide the stable early investment emerging markets need to attract more businesses 
and homes. Preserving historic structures also preserves the unique identity of places.  
 
The unquantifiable benefits of decent affordable housing are considerable. Community 
revitalization, expanding home ownership, and the effective delivery of health care and 
other services are all enhanced by public investment in stable housing. The five case 
studies we investigated demonstrate the varied ways in which housing improves peoples’ 
lives. 
      
CONCLUSIONS 
 
• High-quality, mixed-income housing can help revitalize stagnant or declining 
markets; historic preservation incentives to encourage adaptive reuse are valuable.    
• Affordable housing should not be concentrated in just a few neighborhoods; local 
regulations and land buy-downs should enable new developments to locate in a 
variety of neighborhoods.  
• Building development capacity will help small local economies capture more of the 
benefits of affordable housing investment.  
• Iowa’s economic development strategy should address the need for workforce 
housing in the key metropolitan areas likely to attract targeted industry clusters.  
• Workforce housing will be difficult to develop in many nonmetropolitan counties 
unless we can address the value gap.  
• Iowa’s economy benefits from federally subsidized housing investment, but the 
state’s role should expand: federal resources are not sufficient or well-suited to 
meeting all the state’s needs.  
 
Investments in housing will be repaid in the form of stronger local economies; a stable, 
skilled labor force; a working social safety net and the revitalization of Iowa’s unique 
communities.  
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
What impact do expenditures on affordable housing have on our communities and on the 
state as a whole? When we subsidize home ownership for a first-time buyer, or when we 
assemble financing to develop an affordable rental property aimed at low-wage 
households, what are the returns on that public expenditure? What impact do investments 
have on neighborhoods and on important social needs? How does housing serve 
economic development efforts? This report examines the evidence for the impacts that 
affordable housing expenditures have on different sorts of local communities, and on the 
state as a whole.   
 
We address four kinds of impacts that subsidized housing may have. First, we examine 
the impacts that the construction of new subsidized rental properties have on neighboring 
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single-family home values. This may be the single most contentious question surrounding 
affordable housing development. Using property tax assessment data, we estimate the 
effect that 11 new rental properties developed in Polk County between 2001 and 2004 
had on neighboring home values. Is there evidence that new subsidized rental projects 
have either positive or negative effects on neighborhood home values?  
 
Next, we estimate the full economic impacts that a sample of 10 new subsidized rental 
properties and one owner-occupied development had on both their local communities and 
on Iowa’s economy. We chose projects from several different types of housing markets 
and sizes of communities. We estimate the impacts on construction employment, tax 
revenues, spending on materials and services, and the downstream effects that those 
expenditures had as tax revenues were used to employ teachers or fix roads as 
construction workers spent their dollars on a new vehicle or groceries, and so on. We also 
estimate the long-term economic impacts of spending on operating costs. What 
contribution do new subsidized rental projects have on local and state economies?  
 
Housing may also be seen as part of the economic infrastructure that ensures an adequate 
supply of labor to Iowa’s businesses. Without adequate appropriately priced housing, 
businesses will have difficulty attracting the right mix of workers. If people must 
commute from more distant affordable communities, wages must compensate for these 
costs. If employees are unable to find appropriate quality housing in smaller 
communities, they may not consider working in those places. The third part of this report 
assesses Iowa’s supply of “workforce” housing, identifies barriers to expanding that 
supply and outlines a variety of strategies that may overcome these barriers.   
 
Finally, housing has important social impacts that are impossible to quantify, but that are 
vital parts of any strategy to strengthen our economy. We present five case studies that 
assess the contributions that housing investments make to neighborhood safety and 
vitality, to improving children’s environments, to providing services in addition to 
shelter, and to improving the lives of tenants and neighbors. The cases studies were 
chosen to represent different solutions to different kinds of housing needs, rather than 
randomly. We investigated the weaknesses, as well as the strengths, of the projects to 
offer a balanced picture of achievements.   
 
The report’s conclusions summarize our findings and outlines the role that housing plays 
in economic development. Recommendations are presented on how that role could be 
strengthened.  
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SECTION ONE: ASSESSING HOUSING’S IMPACT ON LOCAL PROPERTY 
MARKETS 
 
Housing investment is fundamentally local, as are its impacts. On the one hand, debates 
about the impact that housing has on neighbors’ home values are at the heart of many of 
the regulatory restrictions and political opposition that raise barriers to housing 
development and increase costs. On the other hand, we also have expectations that 
strategic housing investments will help jump-start communities that have seen little 
recent development and weak appreciation. Future policy decisions should be based on a 
clear understanding of what housing investments may and may not achieve. 
Misunderstanding and ignorance will condemn us to the same unproductive debates, 
unrealistic expectations or inability to tolerate reasonable risks that we have been 
engaged in for decades. 
 
There is mixed evidence on housing’s effects on local property markets. A brief survey of 
academic research reveals a wide range of results (Freeman and Botein 2002; Nguyen 
2005). We know it is likely that housing has differing impacts in different neighborhoods. 
There is some evidence that subsidized housing has greater negative effects in more 
distressed neighborhoods, but that its impact is negligible in stronger, more stable 
neighborhoods (Galster, Tatian and Smith 1999). However, other research has found that 
rehabilitating public housing located in very distressed neighborhoods has helped to 
revive property values (Santiago, Galster and Tatian 2001). Subsidized housing may also 
have differing effects depending on its design characteristics; some evidence suggests 
that high-quality projects designed to fit into neighborhoods may have positive or no 
effects on property values (Cummings and Landis 1993; Briggs, Darden and Aidala 
1999). In general, the negative effects found have been small (Nguyen 2005). Many of 
the outcomes identified in these studies suggest that there may be no single answer to the 
question: property value effects may depend on many local circumstances. 
 
DATA AND STUDY DESIGN  
We examined the impact of subsidized multifamily rental properties on housing markets 
in Polk County. We studied the 11 newly constructed rental properties developed in Polk 
County between 2001 and 2004. Map 1.1 shows the locations of the properties. Projects 
were developed mainly in neighborhoods classified as stagnant or declining; one was 
developed in a rapidly growing neighborhood.1 Projects ranged from elderly assisted-
living facilities, to family housing, to mixed-income developments. Table 1.1 summarizes 
the characteristics of the 11 projects.  
 
                                                 
1 Types of neighborhood housing markets were defined in a cluster analysis of 
census tracts, reported in MacDonald (2003). 
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We studied the impacts that projects had on single-family home values only; duplexes, 
condominiums and other housing types were excluded. 
 
Initially, we had hoped to select projects in several different sorts of counties across 
Iowa, but suitable historical property value data were unobtainable even in other 
metropolitan counties. Only in Polk County was the Assessor’s office able to give us 
access to a high-quality, multiyear database that enabled us to test changes in property 
values over at least three time periods (1999-2001, 2001-2003 and 2003-2005). The data 
set included detailed information on each home’s characteristics, along with a qualitative 
assessment of the home’s condition. Table A-1 (in Appendix A) lists the characteristics 
we used in the analysis. This detail enabled us to match each property located within half 
a mile of one of the projects we studied, with an almost identical property further away. 
Once we had constructed a series of 2,902 pairs of single-family homes with almost 
identical characteristics, we were able to compare property value changes for the 
“treatment” or “experimental” home in the pair (the home located within half a mile of a 
project) with value changes for the “control” home in the pair (the home located further 
away from a project). Appendix A discusses the details of our methodological approach. 
We were able to compare changes in property value before each project was built for 
each home in the pair with changes after the project was built. This approach is a rigorous 
test of the effect that subsidized housing projects have on neighboring property values. 
 
PROJECTS IN THE STUDY  
The projects included in the study were a diverse cross section of “typical” tax credit 
developments. They reflect both the statewide public policy goals that guide the 
allocation of tax credits (through Iowa’s Qualified Allocation Plan, QAP) and City of Des 
Moines criteria. The QAP sets out the criteria used to evaluate tax credit applications and 
establishes a point-based system used to rank applicants. Points are awarded in order to 
give priority to the production of housing that meets several social and economic needs. 
For instance, elderly assisted-living developments receive additional points because 
previous studies have identified a large unmet need among low-income elderly 
households who cannot afford market-rate facilities (Kaskie et al. 2003). Bonus points are 
also awarded for historic preservation projects, high-quality brick construction, location 
of a project relative to schools and other community facilities, housing that contributes to 
revitalization efforts, and many other characteristics. The intention is to give higher 
priority to projects that meet important social needs or that make a positive contribution 
to communities. 
 
The City of Des Moines has also developed a set of clear criteria2 to decide whether or 
not to provide a letter of support for a particular project. This letter is important because 
                                                 
2 The criteria to evaluate subsidized rental projects are included in Des Moines’ 
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developers receive additional points on their application if they have the city’s support. 
Projects are evaluated based on whether: 
• The project’s design is sensitive to and compatible with the surrounding 
neighborhood; 
• Management services appear to be adequate for the intended tenants; 
• Appropriate amenities, including storage space for large items, are provided; and,  
• A recognized neighborhood organization (if one exists) has been able to comment on 
the project’s design, management and amenities.  
 
In 2003, the City Council supplemented these criteria with four additional ones: 
• Projects that support mixed-income downtown housing development;  
• Projects for which the city has already entered development agreements or provided 
some other form of support; 
• Projects that support the goals of a neighborhood plan;  
• Projects that will enable full build out of a multiphase site plan. 
 (Office of the City Manager, City of Des Moines, recommended Council Resolution 03-
559, http://www.dmgov.org/mayor_council/agendas/2003_as/Blue/03-559.htm, accessed 
March 5, 2007) 
 
The Iowa Finance Authority imposes a cap of 144 units annually that can receive tax 
credits in the Des Moines metropolitan area, although this cap is occasionally exceeded. 
Not all of the projects we studied received letters of support from the city council, but 
none were rejected because they failed to meet the material criteria. More typically, 
projects were rejected because they did not rank among the top 144 units to which the 
council usually limited its support. 
 
Three of the 11 projects served elderly residents and two of these offered assisted-living 
services. The remaining eight served families. One of these was aimed at larger families, 
especially those with a disabled member, and provided a range of supportive family 
services. Two projects were part of Des Moines’ downtown housing renaissance (Vine 
Street Lofts and East Village Square). One was a high-quality urban row house project in 
an historic neighborhood (Sherman Hill) close to downtown. The remaining eight 
projects were all in neighborhoods characterized by stagnant or declining trends over the 
1990s.3 The downtown and historic neighborhood tracts were also categorized as 
“declining” or “stagnant.” Nonprofit organizations were general or co-general partners 
                                                                                                                                                 
1994 Comprehensive Plan. 
3 Neighborhood classifications were based on a census tract-based cluster analysis 
of population change, construction trends, vacancy rates and home value trends from 
1990 to 2000. The results of this analysis were reported in the 2003 IFA study. 
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for three projects. Three of the projects included significant income mixing with fewer 
than half of units set aside for low-income tenants. The remainder were predominately 
rent restricted, reflecting the strong financial incentives developers have to qualify for the 
maximum tax credits. All 11 of the projects commit to preserving low-income use for 50 
years. Table 1.1 summarizes their characteristics. Brief descriptions are provided of 
project design characteristics. Projects were grouped into three categories: (1) low-rise 
family apartment complexes, (2) urban-scale, mixed-income projects with high-quality 
design, and (3) elderly assisted-living facilities. We test the effects of each of these types 
of projects separately as well as the valuation effects for each of the 11 individual 
projects and their phases. 
 
Other projects were developed in Polk County during this period, but they are not 
examined here. We assumed that acquisition and rehabilitation projects would have 
different effects than new construction because they would involve existing structures. 
We also excluded scattered site new construction of duplexes because we assumed their 
effects would be different from those of multifamily construction. Most neighborhood 
opposition is likely to focus on multifamily rather than single-family properties.4 
                                                 
4Although, as one of our case studies demonstrates, even single-family owner-
occupied developments may spark neighborhood opposition. 
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    Table 1.1: Projects Studied 
Project  
(grouping) 
Neighborhood 
Classification 
Tenants Size Percent Low-
Income Units 
Design Features 
Lynn Crossing Apartments 
01-25  
(Type 1) 
Declining   Family 50 units 90% 8 buildings, 1.5-story attached units with 
individual entryways 
Parkside East I, II and III 01-
33, 02-02, 03-02 
(Type 1) 
Stagnant Family 115 units 100% 6 buildings, three-story walk-up with 
surface parking and landscaped green area
Woodland Avenue Brickstone 
02-19 
(Type 2) 
Stagnant, historic 
neighborhood 
Family 56 units 29% 1 building, mixed-income, brick  
row house 
Hickory Grove Apartments 
02-28 
(Type 3) 
Stagnant Elderly 40 units 95% 1 building, two-story brick and stucco 
construction with surface parking area 
Maple Lane Apartments  
02-29 
(Type 1) 
Stagnant Family 28 units 93% 2 buildings, two-story brick and stucco 
with surface parking 
Chapel Ridge of Johnston  
02-30 
(Type 1) 
Rapidly Growing Family 206 units 82% 25 buildings, predominately brick 
structures that look like large, single-
family homes; outdoor pool 
The Meadows  
03-24 
(Type 1) 
Declining Family, 
people with 
disabilities 
48 units 100% 7 buildings, two-story brick and stucco 
with surface parking 
The Rose of Des Moines  
04-23 
(Type 3) 
Declining Elderly, 
assisted 
living  
50 units 100% 1 building, three-story brick and stucco 
construction with surface parking 
East Village Square 
04-30 
(Type 2) 
Stagnant, downtown 
neighborhood 
Family 105 units 40% 1 building, five-story brick urban scale 
Walden Point 04-33 
(Type 3) 
Declining Elderly, 
assisted 
living 
60 units 100% 1 building, three-story brick and stucco 
construction with surface parking 
Vine Street Lofts (04-49) / 
(Type 2) 
Declining Family 110 units 40% 1 building, five-story brick and stucco 
urban scale with adjacent shared parking 
ramp 
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Map 1.1: Project Locations 
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FINDINGS 
We began our analysis by investigating aggregate changes in home values for groups of 
homes. Table 1.2 summarizes the percentage difference in median assessed values for 
several groups. The columns show the percentage change in median values before any of 
the projects we studied were built (1999-2001) and the percentage change over two 
subsequent periods (2001-2003 and 2003-2005). For projects developed in 2001 or 2002, 
we had two time periods to track value changes.5 For later projects, we had two previous 
time periods, but only one post-development period.  
 
The first rows show average annual growth rates for all single-family homes near projects 
compared to growth rates for all single-family homes in Polk County. Values of homes 
close to projects had grown somewhat faster on average (1.61%) before projects were 
built, and although it declined, this difference persisted after projects were developed (to 
1.0% and then 1.2%). The next set of rows presents the averages for just those homes 
where a match was found (of the 3,283 homes near projects, 381 could not be adequately 
matched to homes elsewhere). Among this group, homes further from projects appear to 
see faster average annual growth than nearby homes. This differential accelerates over 
the 2001-2003 cycle, then it reverses between 2003 and 2005.   
 
The remaining rows in the table present aggregate changes for homes around different 
types of projects and for individual projects. Low-rise family projects are Type 1; high-
quality, mixed-income elderly projects are Type 2; and elderly projects high-quality, 
mixed-income projects are Type 3. Homes near Type 1 projects appear to see relatively 
smaller growth rates immediately after project approval compared to before, although this 
difference is negligible by the following period. The opposite occurs for homes near Type 
2 projects. There is very little difference in growth rates for homes near Type 3 projects. 
 
                                                 
5We assumed that values would be affected once projects received an allocation 
of tax credits and became “public knowledge;” we also tested scenarios using the project 
completion date to determine whether this altered our results, but it did not. 
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Table 1.2a: Average annual growth in assessed values between 1999 and 2005 (median growth rate, in 
percent) for all projects and by major groupings 
 Before LIHTC Project 
Approval 
After LIHTC Project Approval
 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
    
3,283 Homes Neighboring Projects 6.47 6.60 5.85 
All 94,136 Single-Family Homes 4.86 5.60 4.64 
Difference 1.61 1.00 1.21 
    
All 2,902 LIHTC Project Neighbors 6.12 6.44 5.70 
2,902 Matched Controls 6.73 7.59 5.64 
Difference -0.61 -1.15 0.06 
    
1,497 Homes Neighboring Type 1 Projects 5.80 4.68 5.23 
1,497 Matched Controls 5.42 6.50 4.96 
Difference 0.38 -1.82 0.27 
    
168 Homes Neighboring Type 2 Projects 7.15 13.69 7.41 
168 Matched Controls 7.13 8.31 6.21 
Difference 0.02 5.38 1.20 
    
1,675 Homes Neighboring Type 3 Projects 6.86 8.89 6.72 
1,675 Matched Controls 8.20 8.58 6.24 
Difference -1.34 0.31 0.48 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
18 
     Table 1.2b:Projects approved in 2001 and 2002 
 Before LIHTC Project Approval After LIHTC Project Approval
 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
    
5 Homes Neighboring Project 01-25 13.38 8.60 1.81 
5 Matched Controls 4.74 6.99 3.71 
Difference 8.64 1.61 -1.90 
    
759 Homes Neighboring Project 01-33 6.95 5.13 5.26 
759 Matched Controls 5.98 6.69 5.04 
Difference 0.97 -1.56 0.22 
    
773 Homes Neighboring Project 02-02 6.93 4.91 5.35 
773 Matched Controls 5.97 6.69 5.06 
Difference 0.96 -1.78 0.29 
    
85 Homes Neighboring Project 02-19 6.79 11.12 11.27 
85 Matched Controls 11.79 9.86 7.11 
Difference -5.00 1.26 4.16 
    
493 Homes Neighboring Project 02-28 6.51 4.31 5.62 
493 Matched Controls 5.97 6.65 5.29 
Difference 0.54 -2.34 0.33 
    
614 Homes Neighboring Project 02-29 6.38 4.28 5.66 
614 Matched Controls 5.50 6.58 5.08 
Difference 0.88 -2.30 0.58 
    
279 Homes Neighboring Project 02-30 1.76 4.32 4.21 
279 Matched Controls 4.65 5.87 4.31 
Difference -2.89 -1.55 -0.10 
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     Table 1.2c: Project approved in 2003 and 2004 
 Before LIHTC Project Approval After LIHTC Project Approval
 1999-2001 2001-2003 2003-2005 
    
722 Homes Neighboring Project 03-02 6.78 5.55 5.12 
722 Matched Controls 6.14 7.04 5.08 
Difference 0.64 -1.49 0.04 
    
9 Homes Neighboring Project 03-24 21.64 9.59 2.23 
9 Matched Controls 4.74 6.15 6.64 
Difference 16.90 3.44 -4.41 
    
922 Homes Neighboring Project 04-23 5.82 12.08 9.26 
922 Matched Controls 10.27 9.40 6.60 
Difference -4.45 2.68 2.66 
    
56 Homes Neighboring Project 04-30 8.43 14.61 6.94 
56 Matched Controls 4.61 7.49 5.35 
Difference 3.82 7.12 1.59 
    
266 Homes Neighboring Project 04-33 15.52 6.28 2.97 
266 Matched Controls 8.91 11.45 6.26 
Difference 6.61 -5.17 -3.29 
    
34 Homes Neighboring Project 04-49 2.88 25.69 6.27 
34 Matched Controls 4.65 7.99 6.12 
Difference -1.77 17.70 0.15 
 
Although these descriptive results are interesting, they do not control many other elements 
that may affect differential changes in property values. We do not know what role a range 
of neighborhood factors might play in altering values. A vibrant new retail area may have 
increased home values in some neighborhoods, while a tedious and messy road 
construction project may have decreased values in other neighborhoods. We might see 
these effects in the aggregate changes presented above, but we have no way of 
disentangling the projects’ impacts from broader environmental impacts, without a 
multivariate model that controls for other potentially confounding variables. What impact 
does the distance between each home and the neighboring project have on value changes? 
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What happens to homes that are within half a mile of two or more projects? Do values 
vary more during one time period than another? We constructed a series of regression 
models to investigate the effects of controlling for different combinations of variables that 
might alter our results. These regression equations are explained in detail in Appendix A; 
we summarize the outcomes of two models in Table 1.3. 
 
Table 1.3: Impact of Project Locations on Single-Family Home Values (dependent variable is log of 
assessed value) 
Variable Model 5 Model 6 
 Coefficient (Std error) Coefficient (Std error) 
   
Type One 1-2 years since approval -0.04911 (0.00575)* -0.03841 (0.00631)* 
Type One 3-4 years  0.00497 (0.00704) 0.00848 (0.00727) 
Type Two 1-2 years since approval -0.01108 (0.01611) -0.00844 (0.01610) 
Type Two 3-4 years  0.07802 (0.02341)* 0.08571 (0.02341)* 
Type Three 1-2 years since approval 0.02944 (0.00557)* 0.05163 (0.00645)* 
Type Three 3-4 years 0.00086 (0.01045) 0.02827 (0.02580) 
Type 1 (1-2 Years) X Type 3 (1-2 Years)  -0.08320 (0.01267)* 
Type 1 (3-4 Years) X Type 3 (3-4 Years)  -0.05103 (0.02803) 
Type 1 (1-2 Years) X Type 3 (3-4 Years)  0.03418 (0.02339) 
Assessed Value last year (ln) 0.70662 (0.00486)* 0.70683 (0.00486)* 
Year observed dummies Yes Yes 
Matched pair dummies Yes Yes 
Neighborhood dummies Yes Yes 
Adj. R-squared 0.9268 0.9270 
Observations 17,412 17,412 
Note: * Denotes the coefficient is statistically significant at p< 0.001 
 
Table 1.3 lists the effect that each “treatment” has on differences in value appreciation 
between each of the homes in the matched pairs, after controlling for several fixed effects: 
the neighborhood in which the project is located, the time period during which these 
changes were observed and the exact characteristics of each pair. Thus, the first row in the 
table shows the difference in home appreciation between homes close to a Type 1 (low-
rise family) project during the first year or two after project approval. Model 5 includes 
projects by time period; Model 6 also controls the interaction effects that occur when a 
home is close to both a Type 1 and a Type 3 (mixed-income) project. As Map 1.1 shows, 
these were the only spatial overlaps with which we had to deal.  
 
Once we control for these spatial interaction effects, we see that homes close to a Type 1 
project show a somewhat slower rate of value appreciation (3.8% slower) than very 
similar homes that are not close to a subsidized project. This difference is statistically 
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significant. However, three to four years after project approval, there is essentially no 
difference in price appreciation. The reader should note that this is a 3.8% slower rate of 
growth in home values, not a reduction in property values; homes near a Type 1 project 
still appreciate in value, just not as fast as very similar homes further from a project. 
 
Homes close to Type 2 projects (high-quality, mixed-income developments) see a very 
slight, but insignificant decline in value growth rates during the first year or two after 
project approval. However, this is reversed once the projects are established in the 
neighborhood: homes close to established Type 2 projects in fact see more rapid value 
appreciation (8.5% greater) than similar homes further away, and this difference is 
statistically significant. 
 
Impacts also appear to be positive for Type 3 projects (elderly and assisted living). During 
the first year or two after project approval, home values near Type 3 projects grew 5.2% 
faster than values for similar control group homes. This positive effect was statistically 
significant, but the effect is short term. Once the project is established, there is no 
significant difference in price appreciation between treatment and control group homes.  
 
But despite these positive effects for elderly and assisted-living projects, the table also 
suggests that homes located close to both Type 1 and Type 3 projects see slower rates of 
price appreciation (8.3% slower) than comparable homes during the first year or two of 
project approval. These slower growth rates persist once the projects are established, but 
are no longer statistically significant. In Appendix A, we present a detailed model 
estimating the effects of each of the 11 projects in our study (and the spatial interactions 
among individual projects). These findings make the story more complex. Not all projects 
in the same group have equivalently negative (or positive) effects. While one should 
interpret these results with caution, as some projects have a small number of matched 
single-family homes around them, they suggest that individual project characteristics may 
be as important as design features or type of tenant served. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
These results have several fascinating implications for housing policy. On the whole, it 
seems that different types of projects may have different effects on neighboring property 
values. During the early years of a project (typically while the project is being developed 
and immediately afterwards), a standard low-rise family apartment complex appears to 
slow value appreciation among neighboring single-family homes. Once the project is 
established, however, this effect disappears. This may represent the market pricing of 
“fear of the unknown;” the expectations of adverse impacts on homeowner investments 
may never materialize after the introduction of low-income family housing in the 
neighborhood, so the initial slow down in property values disappears. This finding 
suggests that there is little basis in this evidence for the strong opposition that neighbors 
occasionally mount against low-income family housing; the effects are fairly small and of 
short duration.  
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There appear to be fewer fears about mixed-income projects with award-winning designs; 
initial slow downs in appreciation barely register. Once projects in this group are 
established in neighborhoods, they appear to accelerate appreciation. However, individual 
projects within this group have quite different effects, as Appendix A details, so it is 
difficult to conclude that projects of this type will always have this effect everywhere. 
Nevertheless, new mixed-income projects with outstanding design may play a positive 
role in stimulating residential property markets. 
 
Projects providing housing for the elderly have significant positive effects on value 
appreciation during the first year or two after development. Once again, though, effects are 
not uniform among this group. Appendix A describes the detailed results we obtained for 
each project. The initial positive effects for the group appear to attenuate once the projects 
are established. Three to four years after approval, neighboring homes continue to see 
small increments in appreciation, but the effects are not significant. 
 
Last, one finding raises a warning. Homes that are near more than one project see a larger 
slowdown in value appreciation. This may indicate that clustering subsidized projects may 
have undesirable effects on neighboring property values. Few of the individual effects we 
identify are large and significantly negative, but distributing those small costs evenly 
among neighborhoods is important if we are to avoid exacerbating costs through 
concentration.  
 
SECTION TWO: ASSESSING THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF HOUSING 
PROGRAMS6 
 
This section of the report examines the localized and statewide economic impacts of 
selected housing developments in Iowa. Two dimensions are assessed:  
 
• The overall effects of the short-term construction effects—those that accumulate to the 
regional or state economy during the actual period of construction as a result of the 
housing investment.   
• The long-term effects of operating a housing facility as an ongoing component of the 
economy.   
 
The data for these assessments were obtained from a survey questionnaire, and they 
represent generally reliable estimates of the construction costs and the operational 
characteristics of the measured housing programs. Twelve projects funded with Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits, from different types of housing markets (growing versus 
stagnant and metropolitan versus nonmetropolitan), were included in the sample. Projects 
were chosen through a random stratified sampling method. One project had not been 
completed in time to obtain finalized costs and one developer did not respond to our 
request for information. Thus, our final sample includes 10 rental projects. In addition, we 
                                                 
6 This section is based on analysis performed by and primarily written by David 
Swenson, Associate Scientist in Economics at Iowa State University.  
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obtained information from a nonprofit developer of subsidized owner-occupied homes. 
This assessment utilizes an input-output model of all of the economies that are measured.7 
 
For each project, we determine the amount of measurable construction-related spending, 
including financing, real estate services and other services and goods purchases associated 
with that effort, based on the surveys that were returned. For the 10 rental projects, we 
also obtained information on revenues once they were placed in service, the number of 
jobs at the facilities and estimates of their payroll.  The eleventh project is owner-
occupied. Appendix A discusses the details of the methodology we used to assess impacts 
and the limitations of this method for assessing housing investments. 
 
THE DIRECT DATA 
All respondents itemized several elements of construction. These include architecture and 
engineering costs, legal, land transaction-related activities, site preparation, general 
construction, and assorted financial and other specialized property and real estate services. 
These activities are summarized in Table 2.1 to give a sense of the total construction-
related costs that were entered into the model.8  Given the responses, we identified a total 
of $29.5 million in construction-related activity with the 11 projects. 
 
 
Table 2.1: Estimated Construction-Related Costs 
Pre-construction $4,768,874 
Structure-related $24,012,874 
All other costs $694,923 
Total $29,476,671 
 
 
Two levels of construction effects are measured. First, we construct a one-county model 
for each project—11 models in all—in which we allocate local construction effects. 
Respondents were asked to estimate the proportion of their itemized construction-related 
costs that were bid to local (in-county) firms. This estimation allows us to localize the 
construction effects to the actual economy benefiting from the new housing. For large, 
                                                 
7
 We used Implan to conduct these assessments. Implan is an input-analysis 
software program for processing annual industrial and institutional transactions estimates 
for all counties in the U.S.    
8
 Most of the projects listed land and land broker fees together. We do not model 
land purchases—those transactions occur in a different quadrant of the model that 
reconciles capital accounts, not the portion used to estimate economic values in this 
report; however, we do model the value in the economy associated with conveying that 
land for sale. Accordingly, for all instances where land values were substantial, only 10 
percent of the value was used in the model to represent the cost of all land transaction 
services. Land has no economic impact—just the use of the land does—and that value 
would be captured over time in the rents received on the properties. 
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metropolitan counties, we expect that a large fraction of construction-related activity will 
accumulate to local contractors and service providers. For smaller counties with less 
developed industrial sectors, we expect that much of the construction activity will “leak” 
out to counties with larger construction firms.   
 
Next, using a model of the entire economy, we allocate the $29.5 million in measurable 
construction activity into the entire Iowa economy to estimate the statewide effects. As we 
use the entire state, nearly all of the cross-border leakages among Iowa counties will be 
captured and the whole state estimate, as a consequence, will be much larger than the 
constituent parts. 
 
After the projects were constructed, 10 were operated as rental businesses and one project 
(containing four separate housing units) serves as owner-occupied housing. The 10 rental 
operations are businesses with an estimate of annual output. We use the sum of all 
expected receipts (rents, subsidies and miscellaneous sales) as the primary estimate of 
industrial output for this dimension of the study. Respondents also listed jobs and payroll 
values. The sum of these is displayed in Table 2.2. 
 
Table 2.2: Direct Values of Reported Operations 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Total industrial output is $2.2 million for the 10 projects, requiring nearly 55 jobs making 
$567,073 in labor incomes annually. The incomes reported in the surveys were inflated by 
15 percent to accommodate payments of state and federal social insurance and other wage-
like benefits. The reader will quickly see that the wage value per job is relatively low. 
These are not likely to be full-time jobs and they may include an additional rent allowance 
that is not counted as earnings in the survey.9  Last, for some housing projects, several 
jobs provide client services to residents.  
 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF CONSTRUCTION 
Most regional analysts are very cautious about doing construction-impact estimates. There 
are two reasons. First, people often act as if they occur on an annual basis, and thus that 
they make a continuous contribution to the economy rather than a contribution only during 
the construction period. Construction activity is often cyclical and hinges on the 
performance of the broader economy. Second, the costs of capital are already subsumed 
within the costs of operating a business or taking possession of a home. The timely and 
appropriate investment of private and other kinds of housing is an important foundation to 
an economy. The value of the investment is realized in the service value of the product 
over the life of the project. Our economy measures the output value of the housing as 
                                                 
9
 Were it possible, it is much more desirable to discern rent subsidies, count them 
as earnings, and to then, concomitantly, boost industrial output by that amount. 
Industrial Output $2,168,879 
Labor Income $567,073 
Jobs 54.5 
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either the sum of rents that are charged or the imputed value of rents for single-family 
homes.10 The amortized costs of construction are subtracted from these values annually, as 
when we pay our mortgage off over time. We expect our economy to construct houses for 
new residents and replace houses for some existing residents. In a sense then, measuring 
construction impacts is a form of double counting unless they are clearly kept separate 
from other economic estimates. 
 
Table 2.3 lists the localized construction values for the individual projects. Individual 
projects are identified only by the type of housing market in which they were developed, 
to protect the confidentiality of our respondents. Using the first project as an example, the 
table shows that the measurable construction-related activity of that project resulted in 
$837,998 in demand for regionally supplied construction, real estate services, and 
financial and other services inputs. To provide those sales in that local economy, all of the 
affected firms would have allocated 8.6 jobs making $381,561 in labor income. These are 
the direct values. Next, all of those directly stimulated firms will require increased inputs 
of $166,774 from the local economy, which will further stimulate 2.1 jobs and $66,330 in 
labor income. When the workers in the direct and indirect sectors convert their paychecks 
into household spending, they induce $276,097 in industrial output from industries that 
serve households, yielding 3.4 more jobs making $88,975. Added together, this 
construction project, for the duration of the project only, supports $1.28 million in area 
industrial output, $536,866 in labor income and 14 jobs. 
 
Table 2.3: Individual Rental Project Construction Effects 
Projects in Growing Housing Markets Projects in Stagnant or Declining Markets 
 Direct Indirect Induced Total Multi-
plier 
Direct Indirect Induced Total Multi-
plier 
Project 1: Metropolitan (32 units) Project 2: Metropolitan (50 units) 
Industrial Output 837,998 166,774 276,097 1,280,869 1.53 2,833,476 670,996 844,248 4,348,720 1.53 
Labor Income 381,561 66,330 88,975 536,866 1.41 1,098,676 243,181 275,320 1,617,177 1.47 
Jobs 8.6 2.1 3.4 14.1 1.63 28.7 6.7 8.8 44.1 1.54 
Project 3: Metropolitan (52 units) Project 4: Metropolitan (32 units) 
Industrial Output 2,180,833 407,900 720,944 3,309,677 1.52 2,686,527 493,612 1,039,458 4,219,597 1.57 
Labor Income 1,062,885 151,446 225,545 1,439,876 1.35 1,344,679 184,894 330,540 1,860,114 1.38 
Jobs 29.1 4.8 8.5 42.4 1.46 31.9 6.6 12.5 51.0 1.60 
Project 5: Metropolitan Fringe (49 units) Project 6: Metropolitan (36 units) 
                                                 
10
 This allows economists to allocate mortgage payments into average annual 
values across an entire economy as payments to financial sectors, realized capital gains 
and the imputed rental value of the property for the homeowner. 
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Industrial Output 1,788,374 275,871 407,680 2,471,924 1.38 2,892,650 578,136 1,133,774 4,604,561 1.59 
Labor Income 786,458 95,172 110,925 992,555 1.26 1,477,745 211,011 366,138 2,054,893 1.39 
Jobs 18.0 3.1 4.9 25.9 1.44 34.0 6.6 12.5 53.1 1.56 
Project 7: Nonmetropolitan (23 units) Project 8: Nonmetropolitan (24 units) 
Industrial Output 865,384 138,687 258,658 1,262,728 1.46 412,562 54,960 90,885 558,407 1.35 
Labor Income 371,317 50,601 83,363 505,280 1.36 182,809 18,536 24,038 225,383 1.23 
Jobs 9.4 1.7 3.2 14.3 1.52 6.1 0.8 1.2 8.0 1.31 
Project 9: Nonmetropolitan (33 units) Project 10: Nonmetropolitan (36 units) 
Industrial Output 427,724 73,765 100,566 601,605 1.41 1,236,345 104,621 162,172 1,503,137 1.22 
Labor Income 177,541 25,982 28,789 232,311 1.31 489,457 31,859 37,331 558,646 1.14 
Jobs 5.7 0.8 1.3 7.9 1.39 16.6 1.4 2.0 20.0 1.20 
 
Table 2.4 shows the estimated effects for a project involving single-family construction of 
owner-occupied homes in a rapidly growing metropolitan area.11 We did not draw a 
similar sample of owner-occupied projects; because there is only one data point here 
drawn from a single city, it would not be fair to conclude that the higher estimated impacts 
are a result of the type of housing provided rather than the type of housing market.  
 
Table 2.4: Project Construction Effects, Owner-Occupied Homes 
 Direct Indirect Induced Total Multiplier 
Industrial Output $467,769 $129,953 $98,809 $696,531 1.49 
Labor Income $149,953 $46,804 $29,932 $226,689 1.51 
Jobs 3.8 1.8 1.2 6.8 1.82 
 
Total multipliers are listed in both tables.12  The industrial output multiplier of 1.53 for 
                                                 
11
 Even though a large portion of the labor for this project was from volunteers, we 
allocated the expected amount of typical skilled construction labor to that project. Donated 
labor has value that is ultimately realized by the homeowner in the value of the home and 
must be counted in some manner. 
12
 There are two types of multipliers that are often listed. The first is called Type I. 
It measures the relationship between the direct sector and the indirect sector. It is simply 
the sum of the direct and indirect value divided by the direct value. It tells us, given one 
unit of change in the direct sector (output, labor income or jobs), how much of a change in 
the indirect sector would be expected. Readers are encouraged to calculate that multiplier 
from the tables if they feel it is useful. The multiplier displayed here is called the Type 
Total Multiplier, or Total Multiplier, for short. It is the total value divided by the direct 
value in the rows. 
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Project 1 means that for every $1 in direct industrial output created by the project, $.53 in 
additional industrial output was supported in the rest of the economy for the duration of 
the project only. The 1.41 labor income multiplier means that for every $1 in labor income 
in the direct sectors, $.41 in labor income is supported in the remainder of the economy. 
Lastly, the jobs multiplier of 1.63 means that for every job in the direct sector, 63/100th of 
a job is sustained in the rest of the economy. Multipliers can have plus and minus signs in 
front of them. If the economy expands by the preceding ratios during the construction 
period—a positive sign—when the construction is over, the economy must contract by an 
equal amount—a negative sign. The gains or stimuli are simply short term. 
 
In general, larger, more urban areas tend to have higher multipliers because their 
economies are more specialized and well developed. That means the probability that direct 
firms will purchase inputs from regional suppliers or that workers will consume larger 
fractions in the area where economy goes up as the economy gets larger. Smaller 
economies, on the other hand, will suffer trade leakages because local firms will not be 
able to find as many inputs locally, nor will households find as many of their necessary 
goods and services locally.   
 
Our sample was not large enough to determine whether the differences in multipliers 
among counties would be generalizable to similar counties, but it does suggest that 
experience fits these expectations. Projects built in smaller, slow-growing counties appear 
not to have as great a local impact as projects built in larger or more rapidly growing 
places. But projects built in stagnant metropolitan areas appear to have similar (or even 
higher) local impacts compared to projects in growing metropolitan areas. Growing 
nonmetropolitan or fringe counties capture fewer benefits locally than larger counties, but 
more than they would if they were stagnant markets.  
 
Table 2.5 lists the total construction effects using the state of Iowa as the basis for 
measurement. Here, we capture a very large fraction of the leakages that occur in the small 
area analyses in the previous table. We estimate that the value of the construction-related 
activity by all 11 projects is $29.5 million, requiring the equivalent value of 394 
construction, finance and real estate jobs that earn $14.4 million in labor income. The 
firms further purchased $6.2 million in inputs, supporting almost 73 jobs and $2.16 
million in income. Worker purchases of goods and services for their households induce 
$12.6 in output, 140 more jobs and $3.8 million in labor incomes. Total construction-
related effects are $48.2 million in output, $20.3 million in labor incomes and 607 jobs. 
 
Table 2.5: Statewide Construction Effects 
 Direct Indirect Induced Total Multiplier 
Industrial Output $29,476,671 $6,167,256 $12,562,967 $48,206,894 1.64 
Labor Income $14,381,707 $2,157,087 $3,802,278 $20,341,072 1.41 
Jobs 394.1 72.7 140.4 607.2 1.54 
 
For every dollar in industry spending, an additional $.64 in industrial output is supported 
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in the state’s economy. For every two construction jobs, another job is created.  
 
THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF HOUSING OPERATIONS 
Once built, the housing projects become income-producing enterprises; therefore, they 
produce industrial output. We itemize the local economic values of each housing 
operation, considering again just the county in which the project is located. When we 
measure the regular and ongoing activity of these projects as a regular component of the 
local or the Iowa economy, we use these operational figures. These values are in Table 
2.6. The larger the project, the more it collects in rents and subsidies and the greater the 
effect of the project on the overall economy.  
 
Table 2.6: Individual Rental Project Operations Effects 
Projects in Growing Housing Markets Projects in Stagnant or Declining Markets 
 Direct Indirect Induced Total Mult. Direct Indirec
t 
Induced Total Mult. 
Project 1: Metropolitan (32 units) Project 2: Metropolitan (50 units) 
Industrial Output 174,978 29,782 31,342 236,102 1.35 397,262 95,586 96,318 589,166 1.48 
Labor Income 39,445 10,198 10,096 59,739 1.51 117,822 31,363 31,408 180,593 1.53 
Jobs 2.0 0.4 0.4 2.8 1.38 20.0 1.0 1.0 22.0 1.10 
Project 3: Metropolitan (52 units) Project 4: Metropolitan (32 units) 
Industrial Output 199,103 36,982 17,970 254,055 1.28 127,397 24,045 18,911 170,353 1.34 
Labor Income 16,560 12,306 5,620 34,486 2.08 19,427 7,916 6,012 33,355 1.72 
Jobs 1.0 0.4 0.2 1.6 1.58 1.5 0.3 0.3 2.1 1.38 
Project 5: Metropolitan Fringe (49 units) Project 6: Metropolitan (36 units) 
Industrial Output 378,766 67,285 21,096 467,147 1.23 234,384 53,188 60,841 348,413 1.49 
Labor Income 24,191 20,779 5,739 50,709 2.10 70,863 17,178 19,642 107,683 1.52 
Jobs 4.0 0.7 0.3 5.0 1.24 3.0 0.6 0.6 4.2 1.40 
Project 7: Nonmetropolitan (23 units) Project 8: Nonmetropolitan (24 units) 
Industrial Output 128,051 22,739 23,990 174,780 1.36 201,158 28,967 92,270 322,395 1.60 
Labor Income 30,320 7,889 7,728 45,937 1.52 189,758 8,226 24,390 222,374 1.17 
Jobs 2.0 0.3 0.2 2.5 1.27 15.0 0.5 1.0 16.5 1.10 
Project 9: Nonmetropolitan (33 units) Project 10: Nonmetropolitan (36 units) 
Industrial Output 129,780 18,640 12,556 160,976 1.24 198,000 15,434 14,318 227,752 1.15 
Labor Income 18,437 6,030 3,591 28,058 1.52 40,250 4,361 3,292 47,903 1.19 
Jobs 2.0 0.2 0.2 2.4 1.19 4.0 0.2 0.2 4.4 1.11 
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Generally speaking, housing is not a high-input industry (in other words, an industry that 
requires lots of services from other sectors) with extensive linkages to the rest of the 
economy.  In addition, there is substantial variation among projects. Some require only a 
part-time manager, while others provide extensive services to tenants (for instance, in 
assisted-living facilities). The values in Table 2.6 have been particularized to both the 
local economy and to the actual project considering their declared gross receipts (their 
industrial output), the jobs reported for the project and the labor incomes that are paid. If 
we were to average the overall characteristics of all rental housing in the region, the 
overall housing operations multipliers would be different.13   
 
Table 2.7 takes all of the values reported for the individual counties and places them 
within a statewide model of the Iowa economy. Again, this allows us to capture cross-
border leakages, especially from the smaller counties. In addition, the variance in the 
individual job and income requirements for these projects is summed, and therefore, 
averaged across all projects thus yielding slightly more indicative multipliers. 
 
In all, these projects will generate $2.2 million in industrial output in the long term, 
requiring 54.5 jobs and $567,073 in labor incomes. They will link to $471,224 in 
additional, state-industry-supplied inputs thus stimulating 5.4 more jobs with $156,132 in 
incomes. Through induction, $555,902 in additional industrial output will be sustained, 
requiring 6.3 jobs and $168,246 in labor income. These projects, statewide, link to $3.2 
million in industrial output, $891,452 in labor income and 66 jobs. 
 
Table 2.7: Statewide Housing Project Operations Effects 
 Direct Indirect Induced Total Multiplier 
Industrial Output $2,168,879 $471,224 $555,902 $3,196,005 1.47 
Labor Income $567,073 $156,132 $168,246 $891,452 1.57 
Jobs 54.5 5.4 6.3 66.2 1.21 
 
These are the annual expected and regular values of the housing projects to the Iowa 
economy. The multiplier ratios are relatively low, similar to the most basic service sectors 
in Iowa. Lastly, the reader should be cautioned that it is not appropriate to add the values 
in Table 2.5 and Table 2.7 together. When describing the very short-term value of 
construction, Table 2.5 is appropriate. When describing the economic role of housing over 
time, Table 2.7 is appropriate.   
 
CONCLUSIONS  
Housing subsidies do not just provide a social safety net for low-wage earners or 
workforce housing. They also play a role in sustaining the construction sector. The 
                                                 
13 There is evidence that there are social services mixed in with the traditional 
housing job and labor income estimates that skew some of the resulting multiplier ratios. 
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multipliers estimated here represent a positive (if small) contribution to the state’s 
economy. The overwhelming majority of each dollar spent on housing in Iowa comes 
from federal or private sources. Thus, the $.64 in industrial output, for example, that a 
dollar of spending results in during construction, may be seen as a net gain for the state. 
Every two construction period jobs create another job elsewhere in the economy. 
Although long-term housing operations result in fewer additional jobs than the 
construction period does, every dollar paid to a housing project employee results in $.57 
more income to workers elsewhere in the economy. And, in the long term, managing 
housing and serving tenants produces additional industrial output for Iowa of $.47 for 
every dollar spent.  
 
Our analysis suggests that housing investments may have greater local impacts in larger, 
more diversified economies. In smaller counties, and especially when those places are 
slow growing, housing construction may have less of an impact on the local (county) 
economy, because more of the inputs (materials, professional expertise and labor) are 
likely to be brought in from outside. Without well-developed local capacity, this is 
inevitable.  
   
Overall, housing is not a major driver of the economy. Housing developments do not use 
as many inputs as manufacturing firms do. Housing is also consumed locally rather than 
exported, so it does not bring new dollars into the state or local economy. The long-term 
jobs it provides are more likely to be part-time in administrative or service occupations. 
The sector is not a major employer, although individual housing projects, such as assisted-
living facilities, may be fairly large local employers. Nevertheless, new housing 
construction contributes to employment, labor income and statewide industrial output 
during the construction period, and the longer-term employment and output it creates has 
steady positive effects on local economies.  
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SECTION THREE: WORKFORCE HOUSING  
AS AN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY 
 
According to a recent report from the Iowa Works Campaign, “The state faces the danger 
of worker and skill gaps that could undermine its businesses, erode the earning power of 
its workers and slow its economic growth” (Iowa Works Campaign 2006, 2). Stagnant 
growth combined with a population approaching retirement age may result in a severe 
labor force shortfall. Education and training will be an important part of avoiding this 
shortfall, but providing attractive, affordable workforce housing is an important 
complementary strategy. Housing is part of the local economic infrastructure; without an 
adequate housing stock, local businesses must rely on workers commuting from outside 
communities at economic, human and environmental cost. Some businesses may not pay 
wages adequate to cover direct costs and may have difficulty attracting a sufficient labor 
pool from outside of the community. The National Housing Conference defines 
“workforce housing” as: “housing for those with at least one full-time worker who earns 
between minimum wage and the amount needed to afford to live in the area” (Sullivan, 
2004, 2). 
 
What counts as “workforce housing” in Iowa under this definition? In Des Moines, for 
example, workforce housing would be housing affordable to a household earning between 
$14,872 (working full-time at a minimum wage of $7.15) and $33,565 (the amount needed 
to afford a median-priced home, assuming a fixed-rate 6% loan and a 5% down payment). 
We could also define workforce housing based on the typical earnings of the new entry-
level workers we need to recruit if the state is to avoid the projected labor force shortfall. 
Iowa’s strategic plan for workforce investment identifies skilled occupations that pay at 
least $35,000 as the focus of economic development efforts. This section addresses three 
questions:  
• How adequate is Iowa’s supply of workforce housing?  
• What are the barriers to expanding the workforce housing supply in different 
communities?  
• How could we address those barriers?      
 
HOW ADEQUATE IS IOWA’S SUPPLY OF WORKFORCE HOUSING?  
We begin by examining Iowa’s occupational structure in 2005, and the median earnings of 
full-time workers by occupation.14 This enables us to calculate the home price a working 
family, supported by a full-time earner at median wage, could afford in each county. 
Iowa’s metropolitan economies are dominated by professional and managerial workers 
(who make up a slight majority of the labor force in most places), and the sales, office and 
administrative workers who support them. Together, those two occupational sectors 
account for over half of all workers in each metropolitan county; in Polk, Story and 
Johnson counties, they make up more than two-thirds of all workers. The traditional “blue 
collar” occupations, including construction, production and transportation, account for 
                                                 
14 One constraint is that we do not have current data for all counties. However, we 
extend these estimates to all counties later in the discussion.  
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about one in four jobs in most metropolitan counties. The exceptions are Johnson, Polk 
and Story counties, where they make up less than 20% of all jobs. Chart 3.1 shows the 
occupational structure by metropolitan county in 2005. In the state as a whole in 2000, 
construction and production occupations made up a similar proportion of all jobs (26.3%).  
 
Chart 3.1: Occupational Structure by County, 2005 
 
 
Iowa Workforce Development has developed projections of occupational growth between 
2002 and 2012. Chart 3.2 shows that service sector jobs are likely to increase fastest, by 
14.6% over the decade. Jobs for sales/office/administrative and production/transportation 
personnel, have lower than average projected growth rates according to the agency, at 
9.9% and 11% respectively. The largest volume of jobs will be added in 
managerial/professional occupations, which is projected to grow at an overall rate of 
12.7%. 
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Chart 3.2: Projected Growth by Major Occupational Category, 2002-2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Managerial and professional workers earn substantially more than those in other 
occupations. Chart 3.3 shows the median annual earnings of people working full time, 
year round, in each of these broad occupational categories in 2005 (based on American 
Community Survey estimates). Service sector workers—those providing healthcare 
support services, fire and public safety protection, food preparation and personal 
services—earn far less than those in other occupations. There is considerable variation 
among metropolitan areas in some occupations, especially managerial/professional jobs, 
and less variation in sectors requiring fewer skills, such as service and 
sales/office/administrative jobs.  
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Chart 3.3: Median Earnings by Occupation, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
According to Iowa’s strategic plan for workforce development, the state is targeting 
economic development efforts on three industry clusters: advanced manufacturing, 
information solutions and the life sciences (Iowa Two-Year Strategic Plan 2006). Entry-
level jobs in these industries require a high level of skills and jobs would typically pay at 
least $35,000. We estimate how affordable the owner-occupied housing stock in each 
metropolitan area would be to households earning $35,000.  We assume a down payment 
of $2,000, a $400 monthly debt load and a loan at 6% fixed (the current price of an IFA 
FirstHome loan) for 30 years. This would translate into a home price of approximately 
$124,575. Based on the distribution of owner-occupied home values from the 2005, Chart 
3.4 shows the percent of homes priced at this level or less in each metropolitan area.   
 
Chart 3.4: Percent of Homes Affordable to Skilled Entry-Level Workers 
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In many metropolitan counties, more than half of the housing stock would be affordable to 
skilled entry-level workers. But in Johnson, Polk and Story counties, less than half of the 
stock would be affordable. As these counties are centers of growth and may have the 
critical mass of existing businesses essential to the targeted industry sectors, this shortfall 
may be a future constraint on growing the skilled labor pool. According to the Center for 
Housing Policy’s ranking of metropolitan areas by the affordability of their housing stock, 
Des Moines ranks 134th nationally out of 202 metropolitan areas (Center for Housing 
Policy 2006). Although this may be seen as positive, Des Moines is less affordable than 
many competing larger Midwestern metropolitan areas, such as Louisville, KY (142nd); 
Omaha, NE (148th); Wichita, KS (165th) and Indianapolis, IN (171st).  
 
In the metropolitan areas where high-skilled occupations are most likely to concentrate, 
entry-level workers will have a limited choice of homes. A second source of income 
would be needed to buy a decent quality home. For many younger families, increasing 
earnings will entail an increase in childcare costs, and some may not be prepared to make 
the trade off in quality of life. Another choice would be to trade off commuting costs and 
choose an affordable home in a more distant fringe location. Thus, in rapidly growing 
metropolitan counties, workforce housing faces an affordability gap. The search for 
affordable housing may be driving suburban sprawl.     
 
 High-skill jobs are most likely to cluster in metropolitan areas. Nonmetropolitan portions 
of the state are more likely to continue to attract “traditional” industries with a 
preponderance of production jobs. How adequate is the housing stock in those areas for 
the labor pool employers need? We estimated the home price that a production sector 
worker with median (not entry-level) earnings could afford. Based on the same financing 
assumptions we used above, a home of $109,386 would be affordable to households with 
a single earner in a production occupation.   
A large share of homes would be affordable to production workers outside of Iowa’s 
metropolitan areas, as Map 3.1 shows. Production workers would have a much narrower 
choice of homes in most metropolitan counties. The map demonstrates why counties 
within easy commuting distance of metropolitan employment centers have seen rapid new 
housing growth since 2000.  
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Map 3.1: Percent of Homes Affordable to Median-Wage Production Worker, 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Slower-growing nonmetropolitan counties appear to have an ample supply of workforce 
housing. But many of the homes that may be affordable to production workers in those 
counties may also be outdated or of poor quality. Young families with skilled workers are 
likely to expect energy-efficient homes with central air, modern appliances and at least 
two bathrooms. The predominately older housing stock in nonmetropolitan counties may 
be affordable, but may be less likely to have these amenities.    
 
Providing decent workforce housing in Iowa likely will entail building homes that are of 
somewhat higher cost than the existing stock, or renovating existing homes to higher 
standards. But there is a constraint: even though a production worker may be able to 
afford a home of (on average across the state) $109,386, many housing markets would not 
support such an investment. If median home values are well below $80,000 (as they likely 
are in at least 49 counties, as Appendix B of the Housing Study report shows), the small 
new home that could be built at today’s construction prices would not appraise for around 
$110,000. That price would mark the upper quartile of home values in most communities; 
at an average current price of $125 per square foot, assuming no land costs, a $109,386 
construction cost would build a home of 875 square feet. While a home that small may 
accommodate a young family, it is unlikely that it would appraise for such a price, in 
comparison to the larger homes in the community. Consequently, it may not be an 
attractive option for the buyer either.  
 
Although rehabilitation is an option, the significant costs of modernization may encounter 
a similar value gap. A median-priced older home in good basic condition, but without 
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modern amenities may require about $25,000 to $30,000 for modernization, representing a 
very similar total cost. Thus, at least half of all counties in the state may face a significant 
value gap in providing the housing needed for younger working families.  
 
    According to Iowa Workforce Development, the state will have a shortfall of 150,000 
skilled workers by 2012 (Iowa Workforce Development 2006). If we are to fill that gap by 
attracting new skilled workers as well as by upgrading the skills of existing workers, we 
must address the gaps we face in the supply of workforce housing. Both the affordability 
gap and the value gap must be bridged if Iowa is to retain and perhaps improve its 
competitive position compared to other Midwestern metropolitan areas.   
 
WHAT ARE THE BARRIERS TO DEVELOPING AN ADEQUATE SUPPLY OF WORKFORCE 
HOUSING?  
 
The first report in this series examined Iowa’s housing markets and housing programs in 
detail. Many of the challenges identified there are the barriers we face in expanding the 
supply of workforce housing. The affordability challenges include:   
 
• Housing prices have grown more rapidly than family incomes over the first half of this 
decade.  
• Prices have appreciated rapidly in the state’s growth centers, but some of the most 
rapid appreciation is seen in fringe counties within commuting distance of job centers. 
Increasing urban sprawl may be the result.  
• Although home buyer assistance programs serve many first-time buyers, they do not 
target the most rapidly growing places with the largest shortfalls in affordable homes.  
• Home prices and rents may be inflated by land-use regulations that restrict the supply 
of suitably zoned land and by local opposition to affordable housing.  
 
 In other communities, home prices have not appreciated fast enough and we face a value 
gap in expanding the workforce housing supply. Some of these challenges include:  
 
• Rehabilitation subsidies are effectively targeted at communities with older housing 
stocks, but not necessarily at those with a concentration of high-priced home 
improvement loans.  
• Markets with low median prices cannot attract sufficient new construction because 
homes will not appraise for what they cost to build.  
• Perceptions of affordability may differ—housing costs that are seen as reasonable in 
metropolitan markets may be perceived as too high in small towns that lack a diverse 
job market and other urban amenities. 
• There is a lack of construction and development capacity in small communities with 
low volumes of new construction, which is self-perpetuating.  
• An older housing stock with limited reinvestment is deteriorating, and a fairly high 
proportion of homes in some areas pose health hazards to families with children.  
• Income eligibility cutoffs for most federal assistance programs are too low in rural 
areas, so there is a cohort of households that don’t qualify for assistance and cannot 
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find adequate market-rate housing.    
• There may be an ample supply of housing in many small communities, but it does not 
offer the modern amenities that younger families expect.  
• An important source of unsubsidized affordable housing—manufactured homes—is 
disappearing in many communities.     
• A heavy reliance on sub-prime lending in some communities may destabilize housing 
markets in the future as foreclosure rates rise.  
 
HOW COULD WE ADDRESS THESE BARRIERS?      
Different strategies are needed to address each type of barriers. A recent report from the 
Center for Housing Policy identified 22 policy initiatives that could be highly effective in 
overcoming the affordability gap, although not all are relevant to Iowa (Center for 
Housing Policy 2005). Several variations on these initiatives were suggested by 
participants in the housing forums we held in early 2007. The most relevant and feasible 
fall into four categories.  
 
1. Expand urban land available for affordable development 
• Make publicly owned land available for affordable homes. Many municipalities 
find that new infrastructure investments require moving out of centrally located sites 
to larger fringe sites; the large land parcels vacated may be attractive locations for new 
housing development at urban densities and low or zero land costs would help ensure 
new homes were affordable.    
 
• Reuse vacant, abandoned and tax-delinquent properties. Some states have initiated 
more aggressive procedures to speed the transfer of tax-delinquent properties. 
Brownfield redevelopment assistance can also encourage the reuse of vacant inner city 
sites for affordable housing. Land assembly could lower the disincentives developers 
have to go through with the time-consuming process of acquiring many individual 
parcels.  
 
2. Reduce Regulatory Barriers to Affordable Housing 
• Ensure that zoning policies enable a variety of housing densities and housing 
types. It will be difficult to build single-family detached homes at an affordable price. 
Other configurations (such as attached row houses, cluster homes and high-quality 
manufactured homes) should be as easy to develop. Sufficient land should also be 
zoned for multifamily housing, in every neighborhood, to avoid burdening only some 
neighborhoods and segregating renters in places that may not be close to jobs.  
 
• Adopt expedited permitting and review processes. Development costs can be 
lowered if development approval is more predictable and the process is less 
burdensome. This does not mean communities must give up control over development 
quality. They should spell out fair standards and criteria for approval (with widespread 
public participation) and restrict decisions to determining whether projects meet those 
criteria or not, rather than allowing endless opportunities for NIMBY opposition.  
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3. Harness the Power of Strong Housing Markets 
• Use Tax-Increment Financing to raise capital where appropriate. TIF bonds 
should be used carefully; the balance between housing needs and other tax purposes 
(such as education) should be carefully assessed, or communities could end up with 
many new residents and reduced capacity to serve them. TIF bonds may be best used 
for infrastructure and amenity investments that support both denser infill housing and 
other community needs. They are best used in strong markets where there is a 
reasonable expectation that values will appreciate steadily, enabling revenues to serve 
other purposes too.   
 
• Stimulate targeted construction and rehabilitation through tax abatements. 
Enterprise zones that focus incentives in areas with high proportions of vacant and 
abandoned, but well-located land may be an effective strategy to stimulate affordable 
housing development. Abatements suffer the same danger as TIFs if they are used 
indiscriminately and they should not be used where development would have occurred 
anyway. They are also feasible primarily in strong markets where overall revenues are 
stable or growing.  
 
• Consider using inclusionary zoning requirements. In rapidly growing markets, 
developers may be willing to provide affordable homes in return for regulatory 
incentives, such as slightly higher densities. Voluntary programs have worked very 
effectively in strong housing markets, resulting in affordable homes (for both owners 
and renters) integrated in all newer neighborhoods.   
 
4. Generate Additional Capital for Affordable Development 
• Expand dedicated sources of Housing Trust Fund support. Revenue sources tied to 
overall housing market activity are valuable contributors to trust funds. Iowa’s State 
Housing Trust Fund has an admirable leveraging ratio. Several small dedicated 
revenue sources, such as incremental real estate transfer taxes, could exponentially 
increase the amount of private capital the trust fund leverages.  
 
• Provide predevelopment and acquisition financing. Increasing development 
capacity will enable more developers to enter the market and meet small-scale needs 
that larger developers may find less profitable. But seed capital can be an obstacle for 
small developers, reducing their productivity or discouraging entry.   
 
• Support housing bond issues. Iowa spends far less of its own resources on housing 
subsidies compared to other states and federal sources are too limited to meet most 
workforce housing needs. Bonds that expand the supply of affordable workforce 
housing will aid business retention and recruitment and attract the new young 
immigrants Iowa needs to prosper in the future. Additional capital to develop 
workforce housing throughout the income range identified above (approximately 
$15,000 to $35,000) should be understood as an investment that will be more than 
repaid, rather than a “giveaway.”  
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• Increase employers’ contribution to meeting needs. Businesses that rely on 
attracting and retaining a high-quality labor force may find that investing in the local 
housing market, or providing some form of “in-kind” subsidy to new employees, will 
aid their efforts. Employer contributions to local housing trust funds, or direct 
partnership in specific developments, have become common sources of housing 
support elsewhere. Other businesses that benefit from a supply of low-wage labor may 
be tied to consumer markets and are not that footloose. Expecting a contribution to the 
costs of providing affordable rental housing, for instance, for a healthcare worker 
earning $22,000, would not be unreasonable.   
 
Strategies such as these should be part of a broader statewide housing policy. Although 
many are local-level strategies, their effectiveness will be strengthened if there is a 
statewide commitment to meeting the affordability gap.  
 
Fewer research efforts have focused on strategies to address the other barrier we face: the 
value gap. Nevertheless, there are some potentially effective courses of action. Some have 
been discussed above. Assistance in reusing vacant and abandoned land may be useful in 
stagnant as well as growing markets. Increased capital may aid strategies that meet the 
value gap.  
 
1. Provide capital to jump-start stalled markets 
• “Patient capital” is needed to fill the value gap. New construction or substantial 
rehabilitation is less likely where appraised values will not cover costs. Gap financing 
could take the form of a second mortgage for the difference between the construction 
or renovation cost and the appraised value of the finished home.15 If market prices do 
begin to approach the actual cost of producing housing, the second mortgage could be 
replaced by conventional financing. If they do not, the gap finance becomes a direct 
subsidy to the homeowner.  
 
• Invest in amenities and infrastructure that will make stagnant markets more 
attractive. Many small communities do not have sufficient revenues to provide the 
park systems, public services, downtown investment and other community goods that 
would make them more attractive places to live. TIF districts and abatements only 
exacerbate the lack of revenues. Outside sources of capital are needed to make this 
happen.    
 
2. Investigate alternative ways of delivering housing.  
• Manufactured housing may offer a financially feasible alternative to new 
construction. Manufactured is more likely to be both affordable and feasible without a 
subsidy. But it has limitations that need to be addressed if it is to form an acceptable 
strategy. Manufactured housing is usually seen as a less desirable home ownership 
                                                 
15 For example, the New Hampshire Housing Finance Authority contributes to a 
second-mortgage pool of funds along with local lenders. Second mortgages are made for 
up to 120% LVR (Collins and Dylla 2001, 12).   
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option. Homes are often restricted to parks, where owners must rent lots and thus do 
not enjoy the security of tenure that home ownership should bring. Homes on rented 
lots are not counted as real estate but as personal property, which restricts financing 
options, makes appreciation less likely and makes the housing less desirable from the 
municipality’s point of view. Homes that are not permanently fixed on the owner’s 
land are less likely to appreciate in value, so they do not build the wealth that many 
homeowners expect. However, all three of these barriers may be the result of public 
policy decisions, rather than characteristics intrinsic to manufactured homes, and they 
could be addressed by regulatory changes.16 
 
• Cost-effective rehabilitation and modernization will aid reuse of the existing 
stock. Uniform rehabilitation standards can smooth the process and make it easier for 
specialized firms to meet these needs in many different communities. Enhancing 
capacity through technical assistance and seed funding could increase the number of 
firms with expertise. Expanding consumer access to fairly priced home improvement 
loans would expand the market for renovation contractors.  
 
3. Preserve and stabilize the existing stock 
• Home financing affects the stability of home ownership. Home buyers in less 
rapidly growing markets are far more likely to use sub-prime loans, and rates of 
foreclosure on sub-prime loans are high and rising. Ensuring that home buyers are 
educated about their choices and that they can choose among as wide a range of stable 
financing options as possible will be essential to stabilize home ownership and thus 
communities. Although Iowa has some protections against predatory lending, more 
aggressive measures may be warranted.  
 
• Short-term emergency funds can help keep families in their homes. Even with fair 
financing, low-income owners may face crises (such as unemployment or health 
problems) that can turn into catastrophes if they default on their mortgage. A short-
term fund to avoid default and foreclosure may be a cost-effective way to stabilize 
ownership among those with volatile incomes.  
 
• Strategic decisions need to be made about the preservation of much of the existing 
subsidized housing stock. Where preservation for current uses is not justified, 
                                                 
16 For instance, as Richard Genz argues, if local development regulations allowed 
for small lots both affordable for and suitable for manufactured homes, many more homes 
could be classified as real estate (Genz 2001). Infill sites where older homes have been 
demolished, or smaller sites mixed in to new subdivisions, would avoid ghettoizing 
manufactured homes in just part of the community. Enabling manufactured homes to be 
permanently fixed to the owner’s land, and thus to be classified as real estate, would open 
up a much wider range of financing options, helping the home buyer avoid the sub-prime 
loans which serve the majority of “chattel” manufactured homes. It would also make it 
more likely that homes would appreciate in value, and thus reward routine upkeep and 
maintenance.      
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conversion to alternative uses may be viable. Where subsidized units provide a vital 
part of the local affordable housing supply, physical and financial preservation (which 
will likely involve recapitalization) should be a priority.  
 
4. Enable Communities to make wise decisions about housing investment 
• Provide a seed fund to enable small communities to evaluate their market needs. 
An inadequate local housing stock is perceived as a major barrier to recruiting new 
businesses, but communities are not always equipped to make wise decisions about 
how to upgrade that stock. Speculative investment in the hope that new homes will 
attract new workers who will attract new businesses is often not justified. Lower-cost 
and lower-risk strategies may be difficult to identify without assistance. Funding for 
market studies could better target efforts to develop viable workforce housing.  
 
• Provide alternative funding sources to TIF and tax abatement in slow-growing 
communities. While property tax-based strategies may be quite feasible in strong 
housing markets where values can be expected to appreciate, they are less appropriate 
in weaker markets. State Housing Trust Funds, housing bond issues, employer 
participation and tax-exempt bond issues may all be better funding sources.  
 
These recommendations are examples of what could be done to expand workforce housing 
in different types of markets. The list is not exhaustive and not all of these options may be 
politically feasible. Workforce housing strategies should be developed within an overall 
housing policy, recognizing that many strategies are complementary rather than stand-
alone options. A scattershot approach, or one that cannot be sustained over time, would be 
more likely to waste resources.   
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SECTION FOUR: CASE STUDIES OF AFFORDABLE HOUSING’S IMPACTS  
ON PEOPLES’ LIVES AND ON COMMUNITIES 
 
Quantifiable assessments of housing’s economic effects, and of its economic development 
potential, tell an important story. However, an equally important, but often neglected part 
of the story are the less-quantifiable impacts housing has on people’s lives and on 
communities. This section of the report discusses five qualitative case studies of projects 
around Iowa. We chose projects to represent a range of experiences. Our purpose was to 
examine the positive and negative aspects of the projects. The case studies also offer 
valuable insight into the challenges that affordable housing development must contend 
with; they round out the assessment of gaps and challenges developed in the housing 
forum discussions.  
 
We examined slightly different aspects of the projects in different cases. In three (Castle 
on the Hill, Jackson Point and The Rose of Des Moines), we focused on the experiences of 
tenants, although some neighborhood issues were addressed. In one (Plymouth Block), we 
focused on the impact a project has had on its surroundings. In the final case study (Iowa 
Valley Habitat for Humanity), we focused on the challenges of providing home ownership 
opportunities to low-income households.   
 
In conclusion, we consider the unique and common challenges among the projects and 
outline some lessons for housing policy. In some cases, the challenges faced are fairly 
intractable and our most appropriate response may be to provide the support that is 
feasible. In other cases, challenges could be addressed fairly effectively through simple 
(not necessarily costly) policy changes.  
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CASE STUDY I: MIXED-INCOME HISTORIC PRESERVATION:  
CASTLE ON THE HILL, SIOUX CITY 
 
 
 
  
     
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Castle on the Hill, the old Sioux City Central High School campus, dominates the highest 
point in the city. Built in 1892 in Norman style, of Lake Superior Sandstone, it ended its 
life as a school in 1972. After standing vacant for nearly three decades, the building was 
heading for demolition. In 2000, the Iowa Historic Preservation Alliance listed the 
building as one of the “most endangered” historic resources in the state. However, with 
the aid of committed local residents, a development company skilled in adaptive reuse and 
historic preservation, and a variety of sources of public and private funding, the landmark 
Castle has begun a new life as a mixed-income apartment complex.   
 
The building retains the original entry lobby with historic murals (painted under the 
Works Progress Administration program) and a statue of Lincoln donated by the class of 
1912. The wide corridors remain, but the classrooms have been combined into a variety of 
one-, two- and three-bedroom apartments. The apartments have high ceilings, large 
windows, and air conditioning. There is a licensed daycare on the premises, although it 
currently has only two children registered. There is also a community room and fitness 
room. A small outdoor gathering space provides a place to grill out and socialize, although 
there is no children’s playground. Given the hilltop location, apartments obviously have 
great views. A few apartments (mostly market-rate ones) include turrets.  
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Entryway statue of President Lincoln, showing WPA murals 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The rehabilitation was completed and the building occupied in 2003. It is a mixed-income 
project with 17 market-rate units out of a total of 75 apartments. Market-rate apartments 
rent for $550 to $640, while rent-controlled apartments rent for between $373 and $580, 
serving a mix of tenants at 40% to 50% of the median income. It has few vacancies, and 
usually has a waiting list for one- and two-bedroom apartments. In addition to Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits, the project was awarded both state and federal Historic 
Preservation Credits that helped fund the extensive rehabilitation. Without these sources, it 
would not have been possible to undertake the complex and challenging project. A small 
part of the building is owned by a nonprofit, Friends of Castle on the Hill, that operates a 
gift shop and manages the auditorium, which is a venue for concerts and other cultural 
events.  
 
 Tenants are a mix of singles, young parents and elderly households. A few are disabled. 
Many (28 households) are able to get by without a car, because the building is so 
conveniently located. Tenants’ occupations include operations manager for a local TV 
station, manager of a large clothing retailer, a meter reader for the energy company, a 
small-business owner, a home healthcare worker, a University Extension Services faculty 
member, a production supervisor in a large chemical company, and a daycare employee. 
We interviewed the building manager, Judie Campbell and three tenants whose names 
were picked at random from a list. We asked each of them why they had chosen this 
building and what they saw as the positives and negatives of living here.  
 
Mike Schmidt has lived here for 18 months. He moved to Sioux City when he completed 
his seminary training as a Lutheran pastor and received his first posting in an inner city 
Sioux City church. At first, he lived in a suburban apartment, but he wanted to move to the 
community to which he was ministering. There were no decent alternatives to this. There 
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are cheaper local apartments, but they are badly managed and maintained. He lives in a 
market-rate unit. He was surprised by how nice and well-maintained the apartments were 
and how each one was unique. He likes being part of the neighborhood and being able to 
walk to work. He personally feels quite safe in the neighborhood, but it does have a bad 
reputation locally. He is a member of the tenant association. They do a variety of social 
events and small cleanup and improvement projects, such as around the outdoor seating 
areas.              
 
Pastor Mike Schmidt in his apartment 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Marianna17 moved to Castle on the Hill in 2005. Before that, she and her young son, Tim, 
lived with her mom a few blocks away; before that she lived with her ex in a very small, 
bug-infested apartment that wasn’t safe for Tim. She was concerned that the poor living 
conditions were affecting his health. She waited eight months for housing assistance to 
come through and waited a few months more for an apartment here. She wanted to live 
here because her brother had an apartment here and she knew how nice it was. It is very 
well-managed, each apartment has a washer and dryer, and the apartments are in good 
condition with large windows. There isn’t anything like it in the surrounding area. She 
knows many of the neighbors and her son plays with other children in the building. The 
downside is that there is not a good place for kids to play outside. They can play in the 
community room if other people aren’t using it. There isn’t playground equipment because 
of liability issues and there are no safe local parks they could go to. The neighborhood is a 
negative, but she is close to her mom and other family members, so she wants to live here. 
Her mom provides daycare for Tim. Marianna is in school finishing her associate degree 
                                                 
17 Names of tenants have been chan 
ged if we did not have explicit permission to identify them. 
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in accounting. In the past, she has only had entry-level jobs with low pay and no security. 
She hopes to get a permanent, better-paying job when she graduates and go off housing 
assistance.      
  
Part of the community room, with children’s play area 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Lisa has lived there since July 2004. Previously, she was living with her ex in a home they 
were buying. When she had to move out because they were separating, she couldn’t find 
any good alternative apartments at the price she is paying here. She doesn’t know where 
she would move if she had to; one problem is the high security deposits required in most 
apartments (her parents helped her with the deposit when she moved here). She is 
currently unemployed, but she does help out in the office downstairs.  She’s a member of 
the tenant’s association and knows at least half the other tenants in the building. In the 
summer, they get together around the outdoor seating areas. The thing she doesn’t like 
about it is that she doesn’t feel safe walking in the neighborhood at night. However, she 
does feel safe in the building. Her upstairs neighbor can be noisy as he wakes very early in 
the morning, but that is something the building manager is happy to deal with for her.     
 
One of the strengths of Castle on the Hill is clearly its effective, responsive management. 
Based on discussions with tenants and a brief period observing a tenant intake, rules are 
clear and are enforced consistently. One tenant put it this way: “Judie is really nice, but 
you don’t want to get on her wrong side....” In a tough neighborhood, this is crucial. Poor 
management in other rental properties has allowed illegal activities to flourish there, 
threatening the majority of law-abiding tenants, leading to rising vacancy rates and, in 
some cases, financial disaster. The strong continued demand for both market-rate and 
subsidized apartments is a good indication of how well managed it is.   
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Castle on the Hill Neighborhood 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The active tenant’s association demonstrates that the building’s residents have 
successfully created a community. Tenants appear to know most of their neighbors and are 
eager to cooperate to make small improvements and upgrades. They appear to have a real 
sense of “ownership” rather than feeling merely like tenants. Almost every apartment 
entry was carefully decorated with seasonal items, unique mailboxes and personal touches. 
One tenant has painted decorative, color-coded murals at each elevator landing to 
distinguish the floors and to “brighten the place up.” One entry way has a designated place 
where tenants can leave items they no longer want, such as children’s toys, in case other 
tenants have a use for them. The rather forbidding building is a warm and friendly place 
inside.  
 
The project has had an important impact on the surrounding neighborhood, although there 
are still problem houses and absentee or negligent landlords. In addition to rehabilitating a 
large, vacant property that understandably had a blighting effect on its surroundings, 
Castle on the Hill has had positive impacts too. Tenants and the building manager work 
with the police and the local neighborhood association, Near Northside Neighborhood 
Network, to control what goes on around them. They are valuable partners in the 
community’s revitalization.  
 
CHALLENGES 
As with most of the other projects we have examined, assembling so many different 
sources of financing for this project was time consuming and difficult, even for an 
experienced developer. Preservation projects are inevitably far more expensive than new 
construction projects, especially if the historic features of buildings are to be restored. 
Although State Historic Tax Credits were awarded to the project, they have yet to be paid 
because there is a backlog of approved, but unfunded projects. Caps on the tax credits, and 
a five-year limitation on the waiting list, mean that this source is effectively not available 
to projects being developed this year. Currently, applications are not being accepted for 
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State Historic Tax Credits; applications will only be accepted July 1, 2010, for tax credits 
that will be paid out in 2015.   
 
As a “market-making” project in a distressed neighborhood, Castle on the Hill faces 
several challenges from its environment. Some tenants are afraid to walk in the area after 
dark and there are few attractive safe places for the children in the building to play. 
Vandalism and neighborhood disturbances create anxiety. Fortunately, the positives the 
building offers are strong enough to overcome these disadvantages. But revitalizing the 
surrounding community will be a long-term task. The multiple problems of social 
stresses, negligent landlords, poor management of the numerous single-family rental 
properties in the surrounding neighborhood, and lack of amenities need a multifaceted 
approach. Investment in one building alone, as important this landmark is, is not enough 
to turn the neighborhood around.    
 
 
CASE STUDY II: AFFORDABLE HOUSING FOR PEOPLE WITH DISABILITIES:  
JACKSON POINT, FAIRFIELD 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Some of the most difficult housing needs to meet are those of people with mental 
illnesses and disabilities. People with chronic mental health problems are unlikely to be 
self-supporting and SSI (Supplemental Social Insurance) payments are extremely low, 
placing most individuals at less than 20% of the median income. However, although 
people may qualify for Housing Choice Vouchers, they may not be able to find 
apartments (or willing landlords) on the private market. They may be perceived as 
“difficult” tenants, without the supportive services that could help them live as 
independently as possible. Specialized service-enriched housing is a vital resource for 
people with mental illnesses or disabilities. A recent Des Moines Register article 
(February 18, 2007) discussed the issue. All 99 counties in Iowa used to own and operate 
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“county homes” for individuals with mental illness. Today, only five counties operate 
these facilities.  The executive director of the Alliance for the Mentally Ill of Iowa, 
Margaret Stout, stated in the article that for some individuals with mental illness a group 
home can provide benefits, but that many mentally ill individuals can benefit from being 
as independent as possible.  
 
Jackson Point is an 18-unit complex for people with special needs, developed in Fairfield, 
Iowa in 2006. The project was financed in part with equity raised from low-income 
housing tax credits. It is operated by ResCare, a specialized service provider for 
individuals with mental illness that works in 20 counties all across southeast and south-
central Iowa.  We interviewed Penny Miller, the Director of Property Management at 
ResCare, and a strong advocate of affordable housing. We spoke with two tenants of the 
new facility and with the developer of the project, Richard Read, who is also a member of 
the Jefferson County Board of Supervisors.  Jefferson County formerly owned and 
operated Cedar Creek, a residential care facility (or “county home”) for individuals with 
mental illness. Cedar Creek was closed recently, and although Jackson Point provided a 
home for many of the home’s former residents, the two decisions were taken 
independently.  However, closing the aging Cedar Creek facility was an easier decision, 
knowing that safe and affordable housing would soon be available at Jackson Point.   
 
Jackson Point is adjacent to a park in a residential neighborhood in Fairfield. There are 16 
one-bedroom units and two two-bedroom units.  Communal areas are integrated into the 
design.  These areas include two kitchens, two lounges, a computer cluster and an art 
center.  The one-bedroom apartments rent for $354 per month and the facility accepts 
Housing Choice Vouchers, which enables even extremely low-income tenants to afford 
the apartments. Only one apartment currently sits vacant, but a new tenant will move in 
shortly.          
 
Jackson Point Common Area 
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All apartments are either accessible to or easily adaptable to persons with physical 
disabilities.  All Jackson Point’s tenants have special needs and about one-quarter are 
either mentally or physically disabled. Supportive services help tenants with independent 
living skills; 24-hour, on-site assistance is provided. The support staff assists tenants in 
developing a personalized development plan, outlining individual goals. Tenants require 
assistance with a range of different skills. Some need assistance using their stove, others 
need help balancing their checkbooks and others need help filing taxes. In combination, 
the accessible units, the target population and the 24 hour support staff make this project 
exceptional. 
 
Although some neighborhood residents expected increased noise and police activity in 
the community with the addition of Jackson Point, the site has had no problems beyond a 
few oversensitive smoke alarms summoning the fire department. Jackson Point staff and 
Fairfield’s volunteer fire department are working together to address this issue. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
On our walk around the complex, a tenant named Daniel greeted us. Daniel explained to 
us that the slightly misaligned sidewalk concerned him and that an older person could 
easily trip and hurt themselves. Although the facility posted signs along the sidewalks 
that made visitors aware of the flaw and asked them to walk cautiously, Daniel agreed to 
verbally warn visitors to watch their step. 
 
As we entered the facility, an older woman sat on a brand new plush chair in the common 
area, engrossed in watching The View. Penny introduced us and asked her if she would 
like to speak with us about her new apartment.  Penny emphasized the fact that the older 
woman had a choice—she did not have to speak with us. The woman decided that The 
View was much too interesting. Clearly, the tenants at Jackson Point are allowed and 
encouraged to make individual and independent choices.   
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Another tenant, Sam, willingly showed us his apartment.  After shaking hands and 
inviting us in, he immediately began talking about his efforts to keep his apartment clean 
and apologizing for what he saw as its untidiness. Prior to coming to Jackson Point, Sam 
and Daniel both used to live at Cedar Creek, the residential care facility formerly owned 
and operated by Jefferson County. Residential care facilities essentially acted as group 
homes for individuals with mental illness. At Cedar Creek, residents had very little 
independence and usually shared rooms with three other individuals. During our 
conversation, Sam informed us that he was never going back to Cedar Creek.  Despite his 
apparent dislike of Cedar Creek, Sam did have happy memories of the farm the facility 
operated about 30 years ago. 
 
Daniel had also lived at Cedar Creek for around 20 years. Daniel suffered from intense 
paranoia while living there. Due to this paranoia, he slept little and weighed under a 
healthy weight. Since moving to Jackson Point, Daniel has gained 10 pounds and has 
commented to staff that he “sleeps so deep” at Jackson Point. Much of this progress 
likely is due to the fact that Daniel has his own apartment, and therefore, feels in control 
of his surroundings.   
 
Staff are enthusiastic about the facility’s positive effects on its residents. Before Jackson 
Point opened, some family members of its future tenants did not believe that their loved 
one could progress independently. After a few months at Jackson Point, several family 
members have commented on the great strides their son or daughter has made. ResCare 
staff members believe that some tenants may eventually move to complete independence. 
Our interviews with tenants confirmed the positive effects that staff described. 
  
For people who have always had a place to call home, the euphoria of finally moving into 
a one-bedroom apartment is hard to understand. A ResCare employee told the story of an 
older gentleman, deeply grateful for his new apartment. After living in a residential care 
facility most of his life, the 50-year old man demonstrated his appreciation by kissing the 
handle of his apartment door after closing it behind him. The joy that filled this man 
came from having a place to call home.  
 
Without Jackson Point, the housing options available to its 20 tenants would be extremely 
limited, if not nonexistent. Jefferson County has some affordable elderly and family 
rental developments, but they cannot provide the types of services that tenants with 
mental illness need.   
 
CHALLENGES 
The developer of the project, Richard Read, described the vital role of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credits in developing Jackson Point. Without the tax credits, the project 
would not have been built. Mr. Read also noted that Jefferson County is proud of the 
facility and glad to support a project that fills a void within the community. But as an 
inexperienced developer, one challenge he faced was the complex and time-consuming 
application process required. He noted the cumbersome paperwork and the difficulty of 
identifying and hiring contractors who work on tax credit projects. In the end, it took 
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multiple years and a steadfast commitment. If he had not been so committed to seeing the 
project happen, he might have been discouraged. Local construction and development 
capacity, especially in smaller communities, is difficult to develop within an unavoidably 
complex and risky process.     
 
The facility manager, Penny Miller, has been a long-time advocate of affordable housing. 
She described some of the difficulties that she has faced as an advocate, in dealing with 
hostile neighbors near other proposed developments. Penny explained people’s response 
to affordable housing as a result of fear and misinformation. When community residents 
hear “affordable” they think “criminal.” Although some community members opposed 
the Jackson Point project, Penny believed the resistance was minor in comparison to her 
struggles in other communities. Developing housing for people who may be perceived as 
a threat is always a challenge, but without safe and supportive housing, communities will 
face much greater threats. A recent study of Iowa’s homeless population found that about 
one in three homeless adults has some form of mental illness or disability (Iowa Policy 
Project 2006). Not all of those homeless individuals can be served in conventional 
housing; supportive services are essential if people are to be integrated into communities 
without burdening them. Educating community residents about the alternatives, and 
providing guarantees that a facility of this sort will be well managed and that tenants will 
be well taken care of, will be important if future developments are to meet the needs that 
exist in many communities throughout the state. Community opposition can be a 
tremendous barrier to developments that are urgently needed, but already complex.   
 
A stable source of subsidy is essential to develop housing that serves extremely low-
income individuals. Jackson Point had to use both Low Income Housing Tax Credits and 
HOME funds to be feasible. ResCare has participated in closing three (soon to be four) 
aging residential care facilities and moving individuals with mental illness and 
disabilities into supportive housing in the community. Gap financing is critical to 
continuing these efforts in the many counties which have closed their “county homes.” 
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CASE STUDY III: AFFORDABLE ASSISTED LIVING:  
THE ROSE OF DES MOINES 
 
Iowans are living longer. One of the demographic groups that will increase over the next 
decade is the “frail elderly;” people over 85 with some physical limitations and health 
problems. As people age, they may find it more difficult to live independently, even in an 
apartment. Some may continue to live independently with home modifications, but many 
also need some daily assistance. Cooking nutritious meals, housekeeping, bathing and 
other activities become more of a challenge, but the person may not need the level of care 
provided by a nursing home. A previous report on the housing circumstances of Iowa’s 
seniors (Kaskie et al. 2003) identified a severe shortage of affordable assisted-living 
facilities for people who are too old or frail to live independently, but not ill enough to 
require nursing home care.  
 
The Rose serves tenants earning 50% of median income or less. Priority is given to the 
frail elderly. The 52-unit building combines affordable housing with assisted-living 
services. Lutheran Community Health Services has an office in the building; the agency 
provides the nursing, therapeutic and homemaking services on contract. The Rose 
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provides decent housing along with typical amenities found at market-rate, assisted-living 
facilities. It was funded in part by equity raised from Low Income Housing Tax Credits.  
 
We interviewed the Executive Director of The Rose Affordable Assisted Living 
Communities, Angela Adams. We also spoke to five tenants of the facility to find out 
where they lived previously, what other housing options they had and their opinion of the 
advantages and disadvantages of living at The Rose.  
 
The Rose of Des Moines includes a combination of one- and two-bedroom independent 
living units. It was constructed on a vacant site in a designated city redevelopment area 
that is a state enterprise zone. The Rose has a very desirable location because of its high-
traffic visibility and close proximity to the senior center. The development had strong 
local political and neighborhood support and the Des Moines City Council provided a 
letter of support because the development met several of its objectives. It is a three-story 
building located in a predominately multifamily residential area east of Drake University. 
Adjacent to the property sits the senior community center where many of the tenants visit 
and socialize. King Elementary School, within walking distance of the facility, provides 
Rose tenants a place to garden.  
 
Each unit is equipped with wireless Internet, a refrigerator and dishwasher, in addition to 
a living room, full bath and storage. They are designed to accommodate wheelchair-
dependant individuals with an accessible bathroom and kitchen and wide halls and 
doorways. Tenants can request an emergency response device they can use to notify staff 
if they have any health-related needs. The building is also equipped with a motion sensor 
response system that can detect a fallen tenant anywhere in public areas. Access to the 
building is secure and private parking is provided. Tenants enjoy all the amenities of 
market-rate apartments at affordable costs. 
 
Apartment Living Room 
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Before the development was completed, there were more applicants than rooms. Priority 
is given to the frail elderly with incomes at 50% or less of the area median income. In 
Des Moines, that translates into an income no higher than $23,800 for an individual or 
$27,200 for a couple. Applicants must be at least 55 years of age. Currently, there are 
over 70 applicants on the waiting list. For most tenants, their alternative would be a 
nursing home, even though they may not need the specialized nursing care. This would 
be an expensive and wasteful alternative. Monthly rental rates for a one-bedroom 
apartment are from $510 to $637; two-bedroom apartments are $765. The Rose is not in 
competition with market-rate facilities, because tenants at the income levels it serves 
would not be able to afford market-rate assisted living. 
  
Residents may choose different billing programs, depending on the amount of assistance 
needed and number of meals provided. Many of the residents of The Rose are eligible for 
the elderly waiver through Medicaid, which covers many of these costs. To qualify for 
the elderly waiver, individuals must require the level of care normally provided only at 
nursing homes, such as companion services, delivered meals, adult day care and 
homemaker services. The waiver can go toward food, transportation and other nursing 
costs. In addition to the elderly waiver, residents may qualify for other affordable rental 
subsidies such as the Housing Choice Voucher program. 
 
The Rose offers tenants a range of services and amenities. In addition to central dining, 
there is a beauty shop, a community room with computers, an assisted-bathing area, a 
library, a chapel/theater and a nurse’s office. Residents can invite friends and family to 
weekly movies and popcorn. There are weekly chapel services and bible study along with 
group exercise activities. A monthly schedule of events such as birthday celebrations and 
bingo is distributed by one of the local residents. Residents can live as independently as 
they please. Assistance is available on-site from the contracted healthcare provider, 
Lutheran Community Health Services.  
 
 
Elizabeth “Lil Bit” Hugeback delivers the monthly activities calendar 
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Many tenants are long-term Des Moines residents, and many were in inadequate or 
unaffordable housing before they moved into The Rose. Most tenants are single 
individuals, but there are a mix of couples and related siblings that move in together. One 
of the people we interviewed had been homeless earlier in life. All the people we 
interviewed expressed high levels of satisfaction with the management, the amenities and 
the many services offered. Staff are seen as friendly and quick to respond to resident 
needs or requests. A maintenance staff is available to help tenants with small household 
repairs. There has been very little turnover to this point, as the facility opened recently. 
Tenants may move on to nursing homes if their health declines to the point where the 
basic care provided is inadequate.  
 
CHALLENGES  
When we asked tenants about the disadvantages of living at The Rose, their complaints 
were very minor. One mentioned that pictures of each tenant should be provided so 
everyone could get to know everyone else’s name. Another complaint was that visiting 
grandchildren can sometimes be rowdy, but some residents said they enjoyed having 
rambunctious visiting children. These are minor and easily solved complaints, and the 
management is clearly seen as very responsive to tenant concerns.  
 
One potential problem with assisted-living facilities that contract out for services is that 
the day-to-day management staff may not be able to control the quality of the services 
provided by a third party. The Rose works with an outside contractor for housekeeping 
and nursing services. They have encountered no problems with the quality of service, so 
this is not an issue for this facility. However, as an assisted-living facility certification 
relies on the quality of services provided, a poor provider may put a facility at risk of 
losing certification.  
 
Another more general challenge is that rents for a full-service facility like The Rose 
would not be affordable to an extremely low-income elderly person without additional 
assistance. The Rose’s tenants all rely on either an HCBS rent subsidy or a Housing 
Choice Voucher. These programs provide the deep subsidies needed to house elderly 
people earning significantly less than $20,000 a year. For elderly Des Moines residents 
who earn slightly more than $23,800 a year (the eligibility cutoff for this and many other 
LIHTC-funded properties), but who cannot afford market-rate, assisted-living facilities, 
there are few good options. 
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Resident Genaro Mata enjoys a visit from his grandchildren 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
A final challenge is that The Rose, with 52 units, has a waiting list of 70 households. 
Even if turnover rates are rapid, many eligible elderly households will wait several years 
to be accommodated. The security, quality of life and cost-effective basic health care that 
tenants enjoy should be the social norm for all seniors, but unfortunately it is not the 
norm for all lower-income seniors. Despite the very positive achievements of the recent 
focus on subsidizing the development of affordable assisted-living facilities, Iowa has a 
continuing unmet need as its population continues to age and the number of frail elderly 
grows.    
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CASE STUDY IV: DOWNTOWN REVITALIZATION THROUGH HISTORIC PRESERVATION:  
PLYMOUTH BLOCK / CALL TERMINAL APARTMENTS, SIOUX CITY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Photo Courtesy Downtown Partners, Sioux City 
 
Bringing people downtown 24 hours a day requires attractive housing downtown. 
Preserving historic structures helps create a distinct identity for downtowns; suburban 
shopping malls cannot offer the unique urban environments that historic downtown 
shopping and entertainment districts can. Sioux City is making progress toward its 
downtown revitalization goals through the rehabilitation of the fine Richardson 
Romanesque buildings in its Fourth Street historic district. A combination of federal and 
state Historic Preservation Tax Credits and Low Income Housing Tax Credits (and other 
sources) made the rehabilitation of one of Fourth Street’s landmark structures, the 
Plymouth Block, feasible.  
 
Local architect Edward Loft designed the building, which was developed by the Boston 
Investment Company in 1890. The building’s unique details include massive arches in a 
colonnade along Fourth Street, decorative column caps and a horizontal band of cherubs 
along the length of the front facade (AbsoluteDSM.com 2007). An interior glass-covered 
atrium provides natural light to all floors. Plymouth Block housed a variety of businesses, 
including a bank, a saddler, a clothing manufacturer, the Sioux City College of Medicine, 
the Metropolitan Business College and Aalf’s Wallpaper (C.H.I, Inc. 2007). The building 
stood vacant for some years before Community Housing Initiatives, a nonprofit developer 
based in Spencer, Iowa, took on the daunting task of renovation and adaptive reuse.  
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The completed project received the Outstanding Preservation Project award from the 
State Historical Society of Iowa in 2005.  
 
 
The Plymouth Block Building in 1923 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: Three Quarters of a Century of Progress, 1848-1923: a brief pictorial and commercial history of 
Sioux City, Iowa. Obtained from 
http://freepages.books.rootsweb.com/~cooverfamily/siouxcity/sioux_18.htm 
 
Plymouth Block is a mixed-use building with three stories of mixed-income apartments 
(75% are reserved for low-income tenants) and two stories of office and commercial 
space. The 48 one- and two-bedroom apartments have splendid city views and residents 
can walk to work, restaurants, theaters and other entertainment options. It is close to 
Mercy Regional Medical Center, a major regional employer, and in the heart of the 
downtown business district. A few tenants have families, but the small apartments are 
most attractive to single working adults and couples.  
 
We interviewed Patty Heagel, the community development director for the City of Sioux 
City, to assess the importance of this project to Sioux City and find out about the city’s 
involvement. We also interviewed Roger Caudron, the executive director of Downtown 
Partners Sioux City, to assess the project’s successes and challenges. Jim Johnson, a local 
Sioux City developer, provided further insight into the challenges developers of similar 
properties face.  
 
The development was complex and expensive, with a total project cost of $8 million. It 
relied on a close partnership between the developer, the city and the state. Because 
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Plymouth Block met several important city goals of adding to the affordable housing 
supply and contributing to the revitalization of downtown, the city was aggressive in 
contributing funds and relaxing regulations. The city relaxed building code regulations by 
allowing the building to meet international codes for historic buildings rather than the 
stringent codes that are applied to new construction. In addition, the city allocated 
approximately $400,000 in Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) funds to the 
project. Since the project is located within an Enterprise Zone, it received some tax 
benefits for creating additional housing units within the Zone. The state also contributed 
HOME funds, and allocated the project Low Income Housing Tax Credits. Initially, the 
project secured Federal Historic Tax Credits and later received an important allocation of 
State Historic Tax Credits further in the development process.  
 
The Plymouth Block Building Before the Rehabilitation 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Photo courtesy Community Housing Initiatives 
 
 
All 48 apartments are currently rented. Interviewees saw the project as the crucial  
stimulus to a downtown residential market; Sioux City now has a total of 320 units 
downtown (most of them market rate), thanks in part to Plymouth Block’s proof that 
there was a market for downtown living. As more people choose to live downtown, the 
area becomes more vibrant, benefitting downtown businesses. Both Patty Heagel and 
Roger Caudron commented on the fact that increasing downtown housing units in turn 
increases the vitality of small retail stores and markets. Without tax credits and other 
sources of support, it would have been far riskier to do the adaptive reuse in the hope 
there would be tenants for an entirely market-rate project.  
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The demand for affordable rental units is strong enough that occupancy was guaranteed 
for the 36 low-rent apartments, making it much easier to attract higher-income tenants to 
the remaining market-rate units.   
      
              Interior Atrium 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   Photo Courtesy Community Housing Initiatives 
 
With the rehabilitation of Plymouth Block, the streetscape also improved. The former 
vacant warehouse had blighted the Fourth Street area, as the “before” picture shows. 
Transforming this eyesore back to its historic grandeur preserved not only the building, 
but also made this part of downtown much more attractive to prospective businesses and 
customers. Today, what had become an underutilized warehouse is being used for its 
highest and best purpose. The improvements to the streetscape have spurred more 
investment in the downtown.   
 
Plymouth Block also benefitted the greater community. As a rehabilitation and historic 
preservation project, Plymouth Block benefitted construction businesses since the project 
required more skilled work than new construction typically would. According to Roger 
Caudron, rehabilitation and preservation projects may have a greater economic impact 
than new construction projects due to the additional labor and skill required. While we 
were not able to evaluate the impact that Plymouth Block has had on local property 
values, based on the findings reported in Section One for Polk County, it is likely that 
such a landmark reuse project has had a positive impact on surrounding values, thus 
strengthening Sioux City’s revenue base.   
 
CHALLENGES 
Despite its promise, the Plymouth Block project faced many challenges in the beginning.  
According to Patty Heagal, securing the necessary financing to create an affordable 
building alongside the expensive historic restoration, proved very difficult. Multiple 
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sources of financing had to be assembled, a time-consuming and complex task. Both Low 
Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTC) and Historic Preservation Tax Credits were 
critical to the completion of the project. Private, state and federal loans, and contributions 
from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board, were layered on top of the other financing 
sources. The project received an allocation of LIHTCs in 1999, and was completed and 
occupied in 2001.  
 
A second challenge was finding a low-cost way to provide parking for tenants. Although 
the building is downtown, the residential sector there is still too small to support some 
essential services such as supermarkets. Thus, tenants may be able to walk to work, but 
most still need a car. Parking also had to be provided for the new commercial and office 
spaces. The problem was temporarily solved by the demolition of a few nearby derelict 
buildings, which provided enough surface parking for both the residential and 
commercial uses. A parking structure would have increased costs, but surface parking is 
not an ideal long-term solution for a downtown district.  
 
The commercial and office space on the lower two floors is appropriate for a downtown 
district, but leasing of this space has been slow. The downtown has not yet revitalized to 
the point there is steady demand for new commercial and office space. The growing 
residential sector may aid this in time, but the turnaround cannot be expected to happen 
within five years. Thus, the project revenues depend heavily on the apartments. This is a 
major challenge with mixed-use buildings. 
 
           Apartment Interior 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
       Photo Courtesy Community Housing Initiatives 
 
 
Although Plymouth Block successfully incorporates both affordability and historic 
preservation, the final project had some limitations. In the opinion of our interviewees, 
the level of interior preservation could have been better. For instance, the exposed brick 
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walls were covered and apartments are small. The project also lacks outdoor space—
there are no gardens and no yards.  Although most tenants are single, some do have 
children.  There are few safe places in the vicinity for children to play. This is a challenge 
for an historic conversion of a downtown property; original downtown blocks were not 
configured to provide outdoor spaces, and parks suitable for children have not typically 
been located downtown. Inevitably, tradeoffs must be made to keep costs under control. 
More spacious and historically authentic interiors would likely have added substantially 
to costs that were already high; the exterior authenticity should indeed have been the 
higher priority. Fortunately, tenants appear to have found the apartments quite attractive 
enough as high rates of occupancy have been maintained.  
 
 
CASE STUDY V: IOWA VALLEY HABITAT FOR HUMANITY 
CEDAR, IOWA AND JOHNSON COUNTIES 
      
 
 
 
  
Habitat for Humanity International is one of the best-known providers of home 
ownership opportunities for low-income families. It uses a unique model combining 
financial, material and labor donations, alongside public subsidies, and a significant 
investment of sweat equity from partner families. The Iowa Valley chapter builds homes 
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in Johnson, Iowa and Cedar counties. IVHFH has built 44 homes in a little over 10 years. 
Their ability to expand their model is limited by the availability of low-cost land and the 
competition for public subsidies and charitable contributions. These problems are shared 
by most other Habitat affiliates. We interviewed Executive Director, Mark Patton; two 
families who own homes thanks to Habitat, Joe and Evelyn Kennen and Mona Ibrahin; 
and a Kirkwood faculty member who volunteers with the organization.   
 
Habitat serves an income level for which home ownership is usually out of reach. For a 
three-person family, an eligible income would be in the range of $17,000 to $35,000 in 
Cedar and Iowa counties, or $19,000 to $39,000 in Johnson County. Families must be 
able to repay the interest-free mortgage Habitat originates and each adult must contribute 
at least 200 hours of sweat equity to build their own and other families’ homes. Adults 
are also required to attend a home ownership education course, delivered in four two-
hour sessions. The course covers taxes and insurance, financing, home maintenance and 
landscaping.  
 
The Iowa Valley Habitat affiliate was launched in 1984 to respond to the growing 
demand for affordable housing, but it was 1994 before they built their first home. Most 
homes are new construction, but occasionally homes are rehabilitated. On average, 
IVHFH completes five to six homes a year. During 2007, it plans to build seven new 
homes. The typical starter homes Habitat builds have air conditioning, two bedrooms, 
one bathroom and a family room. They come equipped with a refrigerator and stove, 
donated by Whirlpool. They are designed to fit into urban neighborhoods of modest 
single-family detached homes.      
 
The organization relies heavily on volunteers and donations and is skilled at using these 
effectively. An innovative program is the ReStore in Johnson County, which accepts 
donations of building materials (i.e. windows, flooring, appliances) and resells items at a 
discount. Earnings help to fund IVHFH projects. The materials are generally donated by 
businesses, contractors or home builders with overstock or incorrect materials. This 
program not only recycles valuable building products and raises funds; it also provides a 
low-cost way for homeowners to find materials to maintain and repair their homes.   
 
IVHFH partners with many local businesses and benefits from the partnerships formed by 
the national Habitat network. For instance, Whirlpool donates appliances to each new 
home. The Home Depot has a national partnership with Habitat as well. A more local 
partnership is the one with Kirkwood Community College, where students in construction 
trade programs work on Habitat homes under the supervision of Kirkwood faculty. 
Kirkwood faculty members and employees of local construction firms also volunteer 
their time to oversee work on homes. Coordinating volunteers with many different skills 
and abilities can be challenging, so expert supervision is essential.  However, the 
experience is invaluable for students and plays an important role in expanding skills in 
the construction trades.        
 
Donations from businesses, churches and other organizations, and individuals are critical; 
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fund-raising is an important activity for Habitat’s small staff and board. Organizations 
can sponsor a home, raising the necessary funds and perhaps also providing some of the 
volunteer labor. Habitat has effectively marketed sponsorship as a valuable “team-
building” strategy for businesses and other organizations. Another donation source is the 
national Cans for Habitat program. People collect soda cans and the redemptions go 
toward funding homes for participating families.  
 
A volunteer works on a Habitat home 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Although Habitat is an extremely creative fund-raising organization and the Iowa Valley 
affiliate benefits from the direct solicitation campaigns of its parent, donations alone are 
not enough. Public funding is essential for Habitat developments. IVHFH is sometimes 
offered donations of building sites, but most sites must be purchased. Land values are 
high, especially in Johnson County. In addition, most materials must be purchased and 
overworked staff must be paid. Essential sources of support are the HOME and CDBG 
funds, provided through Iowa City for homes in the city, or by the state of Iowa for 
homes elsewhere (Iowa and Cedar counties do not have any jurisdictions that receive 
their own block grant funds). Another valuable source are the loans made by the Johnson 
County Housing Trust Fund, which is supported by the State Housing Trust Fund. Grants 
from nongovernmental sources, such as the Federal Home Loan Bank’s Affordable 
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Housing Program, or from large banks such as Wells Fargo, play an important 
supplementary role in assembling the needed financing.   
 
Families who apply for Habitat housing are carefully screened and must demonstrate 
their eagerness and motivation to partner with Habitat. They must have been legal 
residents of either Cedar, Johnson or Iowa counties for the previous year. Families living 
in severely inadequate housing or in overcrowded conditions are eligible. Most are 
renters living in substandard apartments, but some are owners of mobile homes. Rising 
energy costs and deteriorating conditions may threaten the stability of their housing, even 
though they are technically owners. Families must meet income-eligibility guidelines 
(between 25% and 50% of the area’s median income) and must also be able to 
demonstrate that they will be able to make mortgage, tax and insurance payments each 
month. IVHFH ensures family budgets are adequate to meet these payments and staff 
continue to maintain close contact for at least the first six months of ownership.   
 
The application process takes about two to three months. First, the selection committee 
evaluates each application to ensure that all requirements are met, and the applicant’s 
credit is checked to ensure they will qualify for a loan. Applicants who meet the 
requirements then schedule a home visit with IVHFH representatives. If the home visit 
goes well, the application is approved and recommendations go to the board for a final 
review.  Applicants who pass the final review are considered partner families. For 
families to be put on the waiting list, they must first demonstrate their willingness and 
dedication by providing 50 hours of volunteer time. On average, there are about 10 to 12 
families on the waiting list.  
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Each adult of the partner family must contribute 200 hours of sweat equity to help build 
their own and other partner family homes. This “sweat equity” is a way to build 
relationships with the families. Families usually work Fridays and Saturdays; hours may 
be spent painting homes, working at the IVHFH office, providing food to the volunteers 
and attending home ownership classes. To earn additional hours, partner families can 
encourage friends and family to participate to earn additional hours. 
  
When the home is complete, an interest-free, first-mortgage loan is made to the family. In 
addition, a 15-year silent second mortgage is originated for the difference between the 
first loan and the fair market value of the home. No payments are required on this second 
mortgage and it begins to be forgiven in the eighth year. By the fifteenth year, the second 
loan is entirely forgiven. This ensures that Habitat’s subsidy is recaptured if the family 
sells the home during the first eight years, but it also allows owners to build up 100% 
equity in the home if they stay for at least 15 years. IVHFH stays in contact with the 
families for at least six months from move-in day to provide financial counseling and 
household maintenance advice if needed.   
 
CHALLENGES 
Habitat’s model has many strong points, but the organization does face challenges that 
slow the pace at which it can meet the demand for affordable homes. Many of these are 
shared by other Habitat affiliates across the nation. One of the major challenges for the 
Iowa Valley affiliate is finding a sufficient supply of affordable building sites, especially 
in the Iowa City area, where demand is concentrated. As we saw in the study of housing 
markets, the Johnson County area in general has high housing prices and higher rates of 
affordability problems for low-income households. In Iowa City, IVHFH has been 
purchasing land further and further south of Highway 6, where land is available and 
affordable. However, the city of Iowa City is concerned that lower-priced housing is 
increasingly being concentrated in that neighborhood. Neighborhood opposition to 
further concentrations of affordable housing in just one elementary school district led to 
the establishment of a Scattered Site Housing Task Force in 2004. The Task Force 
recommended that future subsidized housing development should occur in other 
neighborhoods with lower concentrations of affordable homes. Thus, the city has 
concerns about providing HOME and CDBG funds to IVHFH for homes south of 
Highway 6. However, Habitat has great difficulty finding affordable land in other 
neighborhoods. This is a dilemma: residential segregation of low-income households is 
not good for families or neighborhoods, but funds are insufficient for single-family home 
sites in more expensive neighborhoods. Typically, HOME or CDBG funds provide 
between 30% and 40% of the price of a home site. New subdivisions in more expensive 
neighborhoods also may not provide small enough sites to be affordable to Habitat. This 
is a constraint on Habitat’s ability to increase its production. 
 
Although qualified families remain on the waiting list longer than they would if Habitat 
had easier access to land, the organization also reports it has difficulty finding qualified 
families.  Some of the families that apply do not meet minimum requirements. They may 
need assistance, but may not be able to afford the required mortgage payments and other 
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monthly costs, or their credit may not be acceptable. Habitat is a good solution for some 
families, but it cannot serve all who are in need of decent affordable housing. The Iowa 
Valley affiliate does not build higher-density homes (duplexes or fourplexes). However, 
affiliates in other higher-cost housing markets have begun to build denser homes because 
land costs put single-family detached homes out of reach even of families at the upper 
end of Habitat’s income range. Credit counseling is another strategy that could increase 
the number of qualified families. Habitat’s homeowner education classes are offered to 
families who already meet its minimum requirements, so they cannot address more 
fundamental credit problems.     
 
Financing is another constraint on Habitat’s productivity. IVHFH staff and board 
members spend significant time searching for sponsoring groups and other financing 
sources. Conventional bank financing is not feasible because families are charged no 
interest on the mortgage. However, this means that Habitat must have sufficient capital to 
originate the no-interest loans and the deferred second mortgage that is often forgiven. 
Loans are usually paid back over a 20- or 25-year period, so it will be some time before 
the Iowa Valley affiliate is able to recycle scarce capital. There is no appropriate source 
of liquidity (such as a secondary market) that could speed this process. Relying on grants 
or long-term, zero-interest financing means the process of developing each home is 
laborious and resource intensive.    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Another obstacle the Iowa Valley affiliate has faced is neighborhood opposition. Habitat 
builds modest single-family homes, typical of the homes built in the 1950s and 1960s that 
make up many stable, attractive family neighborhoods throughout Iowa and the nation. 
However, neighborhood residents have raised concerns about the appearance of the 
homes and the effect that they expect subsidized housing to have on their quality of life 
and property values. Despite the careful screening process for each partner family, and 
the effort families put into qualifying for a home, some neighbors are convinced that any 
low-income housing will result in decreasing property values and increasing crime rates. 
Some neighbors have argued that Habitat homes do not fit in their neighborhood and will 
be too obviously “low-income housing.” Many Habitat affiliates report similar problems. 
Social expectations of what a “starter” home should include have been rising, along with 
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average home sizes. Three decades ago, an acceptable starter home had two bedrooms, 
one bathroom and a kitchen. Now, many believe it should have at least three bedrooms, 
two bathrooms, a two-car garage, air-conditioning, a dishwasher and many more 
expensive features. This is a dilemma: on the one hand, Habitat must keep homes modest 
to keep costs down, but neighborhood opposition further limits the availability of both 
land and public subsidies.  
 
CONCLUSIONS 
The five projects examined here are a small sample of both the success stories we have to 
tell about developing housing that changes people’s lives and builds communities, and of 
the challenges that developers, local governments, social service providers, lenders and 
others face in making these success stories a reality. Based on our discussions with the 
participants in these projects, we identify several implications for future housing policy 
discussions.  
 
FINANCING 
The tax credit application process could be made simpler and easier for inexperienced 
developers meeting important local needs. Hands-on technical assistance for new 
developers could help streamline the process and enable local leaders to take the initiative 
in solving their community’s problems. Access to a combined pool of subsidies and loans 
could also streamline the process for smaller, less experienced developers.  
 
Assembling financing for unique, high-profile projects is time consuming and 
challenging even for experienced developers. The waiting list for state historic 
preservation tax credits has likely slowed the pace at which innovative adaptive reuse 
projects are occurring. Adaptive reuse is a valuable strategy that preserves not only 
unique structures, but can also create a sense of “place.” It will be far less effective at 
this, however, if only isolated investments occur. A critical mass must be created if our 
investments are to pay off. Another strategy that could ease the process could be the 
selective use of state guarantees for private lenders.  
 
Mixed-use projects are desirable in downtown areas, but developers need some guarantee 
that commercial space will not be a burden on the low-rent housing. Guaranteed leasing 
or some other mechanism is needed for projects where the current market is unlikely to 
absorb enough space in the short to medium term. Affordable housing should not be 
placed in the position of subsidizing vacant commercial space that is in the city’s 
interests.  
 
For developers of homes for sale to low-income buyers, a more predictable supply of 
funding for deferred second mortgages, and more liquidity for no-interest first mortgages, 
could increase capacity. Currently, public subsidies cover only a small portion of the 
funds needed for each home, and fund-raising absorbs a significant amount of staff and 
board time in most organizations. This slows production. Recycling low- or no-interest 
first mortgages over a shorter time period would also capacity. A “social investment” 
oriented secondary market outlet that blended pools of mortgages with different interest 
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rates (similar to the secondary market established by Enterprise and the NeighborWorks 
Network) could be an effective strategy. Given the screening and supports that many 
home ownership assistance organizations provide, mortgages are likely to be low risk. 
      
REGULATION, PUBLIC EDUCATION AND OUTREACH 
Educating community residents about the role housing plays in satisfying important 
social needs is crucial. Neighbor’s fears should not automatically be dismissed as 
prejudice, but neighbors do need to be engaged in broader discussions about how 
communities will meet the needs of the least-well-off residents (such as people with 
special needs). Presenting examples of how other communities have met these needs, and 
the effects that projects have had on neighborhoods, may be an effective way to educate 
people about the options. Neighbors also deserve guarantees that management will be 
held accountable to the community and that any future legitimate concerns will be 
addressed.    
 
Not all opposition to subsidized housing can be justified as motivated by fear. Some 
opposition is motivated by the desire to maximize the price of neighboring development, 
which might be in the interests of individual homeowners but is rarely in the 
community’s interest. Fair standards for design guidelines could be agreed to by 
neighbors ahead of time, forestalling opposition to specific projects that meet those 
standards. Design standards would have to be carefully developed to ensure homes could 
still be built affordably. But reasonable solutions do exist; for instance, duplexes can be 
designed to look like large single-family homes. One good starting resource is Affordable 
Housing Design Advisor (http://www.designadvisor.org/). 
 
More creative approaches are needed to deal with the shortage of land for affordable 
housing in rapidly growing areas. Land costs could be reduced if densities could be 
raised, but sufficient appropriately zoned land would have to be available throughout the 
community. One strategy some communities have used is to provide a density bonus for 
affordable housing only; the bonus could be made conditional on meeting agreed-on 
design standards. 
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APPENDIX A: METHODOLOGY 
 
PROPERTY VALUE IMPACT ANALYSIS 
Planning initiatives designed to increase the supply of affordable housing in local 
communities often encounter neighborhood opposition due to a perception that such 
projects depress values of nearby homes. In this study, we design a natural experiment in 
Polk County and estimate the valuation effects from new construction of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit (LIHTC) projects on neighboring single-family homes. 
Operationally, we define neighboring homes as all single-family parcels within a half-
mile radius of each of 11 new LIHTC projects approved between 2001 and 2004. Using 
data from the county assessor’s 1999 residential inventory, we employ a propensity score 
matching technique to define pairs of properties. This technique assigns a control 
property from the same county to each parcel that meets the neighbor criterion. Matches 
are based on 1999 assessed value and common Hedonic pricing variables including 
specific parcel, neighborhood and market characteristics. The evaluative models estimate 
the impact from LIHTC project locations on assessed values using a 1999–2005 panel of 
neighbors and their matches, while controlling for unobserved heterogeneity. 
 
In this study, we estimate that the siting of low-rise family LIHTC-subsidized apartment 
complexes slowed the valuation of neighboring single-family homes by between zero and 
3.84%, depending on the particular project and neighborhood. At one extreme, the nine 
single-family homes neighboring Lynn Crossing Apartments (01-25) and The Meadows 
(03-24) projects experienced sharp declines in their growth rates of assessed valuation 
since those projects were approved. With so few neighboring single-family homes, we 
believe the estimated coefficients for those two projects, located in the extreme southern 
part of the county, do not reliably measure typical effects from type 1 projects (low-rise 
family apartment complexes). However, one cannot easily dismiss the consistent findings 
of negative effects for every type 1 project approved for the county during this period. 
Although no single model estimates negative effects that are significantly different from 
zero for every type 1 project, the negative effect for every type 1 project was found to 
differ from zero significantly in at least one of the models. We believe model 6 in Table 
A-3 below provides the most reliable estimate of a detrimental impact on property values 
from type 1 projects, amounting to a 3.84% slower rate of growth for neighboring single-
family homes. It is also important to point out that the negative impact from type 1 
projects appears to be short-lived. Only project impacts from one to two years after its 
approval differ significantly from zero; impacts on the rate of property valuation in the 
third to fourth year after approval are much smaller and are not statistically different from 
zero. 
 
On the other hand, we found divergent neighborhood valuation effects among type 2 
(high-quality mixed-income) projects and among type 3 LIHTC projects for the elderly, 
with positive impacts from individual projects dominating negative effects for the 
estimates by groupings in model 6. We estimate the neighborhood impact from type 2 
projects to range from slowing the growth rate by 8.09% for the 34 homes neighboring 
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the Vine Street Lofts (04-49) project to accelerating the rate of valuation by 7.54% in the 
case of the 85 neighbors to the Woodland Avenue Brickstone (02-19) project. Although 
the coefficient in model 6 is negative for effects one to two years after type 2 project 
approval, it is not significantly different from zero because the positive effect from 
project 02-19 counters the negative effect from project 04-49. The coefficient for three to 
four years after project approval is significantly positive because project 04-49 has not 
yet been observed three to four years after its approval in 2004. For the third project of 
this type, East Village Square (04-30), both models 8 and 14 estimate a negative effect, 
although the coefficient is statistically different from zero in model 14, but not in model 
8. 
 
Similarly, we found that the effects for type 3 (elderly) projects range from slowing the 
rate of valuation by 4.49% in the case of the 266 neighbors to the Walden Point (04-33) 
project, to accelerating the growth rate by 6.99% for the 922 single-family homeowners 
near The Rose of Des Moines (04-23) project. For the third project of this type, Hickory 
Grove Apartments (02-28), we estimated a coefficient that is statistically close to zero. 
Because projects 04-23 and 04-33 were both approved in 2004, we interpret the 
significantly positive coefficient for one to two years since approval as evidence that the 
positive effect from 04-23 has dominated the negative effect from 04-33. Our best 
estimates for the effects from type 3 LIHTC projects for the elderly suggest that they 
have accelerated the rates of valuation for neighboring single-family homes by 2.29% (in 
model 13) to 5.16% (in model 6). 
 
STUDY LIMITATIONS 
These estimates may have significant policy implications. We plan to continue the study 
to address its limitations. The first limitation is the reliance on equalized assessed values 
of single-family homes as the measure of home prices. The strength and justification for 
using assessed values rather than another measure, such as sale price, is to obtain a 
complete coverage of homes neighboring LIHTC projects and their matches; many fewer 
homes will have sold during the period for which data are available and even fewer will 
have sold more than once. An alternative approach to a natural experiment such as this 
one is to use repeated arm’s-length sales data. Although it is extremely unlikely we could 
find an adequate number of repeated sales among homes near the 11 projects, we will test 
the current models with sales data for each year (1998 through current) to ensure that 
findings are not driven by timing of neighborhood revaluations or other particulars in the 
assessment process.  
 
Second, the models have been designed to test for effects at distances shorter than one-
half mile. We will examine results for single-family homes located within one-quarter 
mile and one-eighth mile radii of the 11 LIHTC projects. While there is some reason to 
anticipate that any negative effects should be more negative at shorter distances and less 
negative or nonexistent further away, we are uncertain whether this or the opposite 
hypothesis is better grounded. Some research has observed that effects have become 
more negative at greater distances (of course, still within a reasonable distance threshold 
of, say, one-half mile). We believe this could potentially be driven by decreasing 
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compatibility between the stock of single-family homes and the project as distance 
increases, and not necessarily driven by model misspecification.  
 
Third, the effects of LIHTC projects examined in this study include the more general 
impact on single-family home values that might arise from siting any multifamily 
housing structure. In other words, the comparison we make is LIHTC project to no 
LIHTC project. Although an examination of the effects of multifamily housing in general 
is beyond the scope of the current study, we believe such a study would be worthwhile to 
test whether valuation effects arise from the particular status of a subsidized multifamily 
project versus one that is financed entirely with private resources. We will identify the 
locations of all new multifamily housing units constructed in Polk County between 1997 
and 2004 to enable further research on the topic.  
 
METHODS 
Our analytical method is to examine temporal changes in assessed values before and after 
the approval of the 11 LIHTC projects in the county and we use quasi-experimental 
research techniques to understand what would have happened to the values of 
neighboring single-family homes if the projects had not been approved. The basic 
approach to evaluating the impact of a project or intervention on an outcome Y  in 
classical research design is to randomly assign cases into two groups or trials T , that is, a 
treatment group of cases that receive the intervention ( 1=T ) and a control group that 
does not receive the treatment ( 0=T ). Random assignment assures an unbiased 
experiment in that any observed or unobserved characteristics among cases other than 
receipt of the intervention under question have an equal probability of falling into either 
group. Another key aspect of experimental research is measuring the outcome before and 
after the intervention. In an experiment with two time periods, 0=t  indicates a period 
before the treatment group receives the intervention and 1=t  indicates a post-treatment 
time period. Every case will have two or more observations, at least one pretreatment and 
at least one posttreatment observation, and cases are indexed by Ni ,...,1= . In classical 
research design, the outcome iY  is typically modeled as: 
 
 ( ) iiiiii tTtTY ε+⋅δ+γ+β+α=  (1) 
 
where α  is a constant term, β  is a treatment group specific effect accounting for average 
permanent differences between treatment and control groups; γ  is a time trend common 
to treatment and control groups; δ  is the true effect of the intervention; and iε  is a 
random, unobserved error term that contains all determinants of iY  that the model omits. 
The goal of program evaluation is to find the best estimate of δ  with the available data. 
 
When the assumptions of the classical linear regression model hold as in a pure 
experiment where cases are assigned randomly to treatment and control groups prior to 
intervention, the simple difference in difference estimator is an unbiased estimator of δ . 
The difference in difference estimator DDδˆ  is the difference in average outcome in the 
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treatment group before and after treatment minus the difference in average outcome in 
the control group before and after treatment 
 
 ( )CCTTDD YYYY 0101ˆ −−−=δ  
 
or equivalently, 
 
 ( )CTCTDD YYYY 0011ˆ −−−=δ  (2) 
 
where TY1  and 
CY1  are the sample averages after intervention for the treatment and 
control group, respectively, and TY0  and 
CY0  are the sample averages before intervention 
for the corresponding groups. Difference in difference estimates can be obtained for this 
study from Table 1.2 simply by subtracting any “before LIHTC project approval” 
difference from a corresponding “after LIHTC project approval” difference in the same 
row. 
 
In a natural experiment such as the location of Low Income Housing Tax Credit projects, 
“treatment” cases experiencing the intervention have been predetermined by project 
siting and policy, not by random assignment. Lacking the ability to randomly assign 
cases and restrict which group receives the treatment, the researcher can use quasi-
experimental techniques to mimic the research design of controlled experiments, 
allowing the possibility of easy-to-understand inferences about the impact of the 
program. First, one must identify a treatment group affected by the project and a group of 
potential controls not affected by the project. Quasi-experimental techniques can be used 
to find and match the cases among the set of potential controls that are most similar in 
every respect to the treatment group, except that the control group did not experience the 
intervention, thus preserving the intent behind random assignment in experimental 
design.18 If the matching technique sufficiently controls for other factors that might 
                                                 
 18 For discussions and applications of quasi-experimental techniques, see Cook, 
T.D. and Campbell D.T. (1979). Quasi-Experimentation: Design and Analysis Issues for 
Field Settings. Boston: Houghton-Mifflin; Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Sadek Wahba. (1999). 
“Causal Effects in Nonexperimental Studies: Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training 
Programs,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 94, pp. 1053–1062; Dehejia, 
Rajeev H. and Sadek Wahba. (2002). “Propensity Score Matching Methods for 
Nonexperimental Causal Studies,” Review of Economics and Statistic, 84, pp. 151–161; 
Holzer, Harry J., John M. Quigley, and Steven Raphael. (2003). “Public Transit and the 
Spatial Distribution of Minority Employment: Evidence from a Natural Experiment,” 
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management 22, pp. 415–441; Rosenbaum, Paul R. and 
Donald B. Rubin. (1983). “The Central Role of the Propensity Score in Observational 
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explain the variables of interest (values of single-family homes in this study), then a 
simple comparison of means across experimental and control groups such as the 
difference in difference estimator DDδˆ  in Equation (2) would be meaningful and 
unbiased. However, in the instance of housing, which is notoriously heterogeneous, any 
differences between the treatment and control groups in important variables that affect 
the value of a home could bias DDδˆ  as an estimator of δ  in Equation (1). In instances 
when the matching technique is not so perfect, as often is the case, a common solution to 
this problem is to combine quasi-experimental methods with regression analysis to 
further control for possibly confounding factors, such as unobserved heterogeneity. For 
an outcome variable Y , the general modeling approach is 
 
 uIaaaaY +′+++= 3210 21 XX  (3) 
 
 vbbbI +++= 210 ZX1  (4) 
 
where Y  is the outcome variable; I  is an indicator variable equal to 1 if the observation 
is in the treatment group and 0 if the observation is in the superset of potential controls; 
I ′  is a dummy variable equal to 1 for observations in the treatment group and 0 for 
observations in the matched control group based on the propensity score analysis; 1X  is a 
vector of variables associated with group membership I  and the outcome variable Y ; 
2X  and Z  are additional vectors of variables associated with Y  or I , respectively; 0a , 
1a , 2a , 3a , 0b , 1b , and 2b  are coefficient vectors or scalars to be estimated; and u  and 
v  are error terms. 
 
Adapting the above general model to the case of Low Income Housing Tax Credit 
projects and valuation of neighboring single-family homes, the Y  variable is the log of a 
parcel’s total assessed value and I  is a dummy variable indicating whether the parcel is 
located within a threshold distance of a new LIHTC project constructed between 2001 
and 2004. The impact of the LIHTC project on single-family home values is measured by 
3a , the coefficient on I ′ . In our quasi-experimental approach, Equation (4) is the logistic 
regression we use to estimate the propensity scores by which control parcels are matched 
to treatment parcels that are near projects. The propensity scores are the estimated 
probabilities from the model of each parcel receiving an LIHTC project in its 
neighborhood ( )1=IPr . Our use of propensity score matching in this instance differs 
from the most common applications that examine the effect of specific programs such as 
welfare or job training programs for individuals or enterprise zone programs for 
                                                                                                                                                 
Studies for Causal Effects,” Biometrika, 70, pp. 41—55; Smith, Jeffrey A. and Petra E. 
Todd. (2005). “Does Matching Overcome LaLonde’s Critique of Nonexperimental 
Estimators?” Journal of Econometrics, 125, pp. 305–353. 
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geographic areas.19 Rather than predicting a parcel’s selection for participation in a 
program, we use the selection regression in Equation (4) simply to choose as controls the 
parcels located farther than one-half mile from any LIHTC project that are most similar 
to those treatment parcels located near a project approved between 2001 and 2004. The 
indicator variable I ′  is constructed based on matched pairs from the propensity score 
regression in Equation (4) and the propensity score is based on finding pairs of parcels 
that are similar in regard to a number of specific parcel, neighborhood and market 
characteristics. 
 
PROPENSITY SCORE MODEL 
Observed characteristics at the parcel, neighborhood and market level must be held 
constant across the treatment and control group prior to the intervention; therefore, on the 
right-hand side of Equation (4) we include total assessed value, age of the structure, 
distance to the state capitol, the parcel’s land area, the structure’s total living area, 
number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, basement area, attached garage area, 
condition of the structure, exterior wall material, foundation material, heating type, the 
block’s minority population, home ownership rate, and its homeowner vacancy rate and 
the census tract’s median family income, poverty rate and its rate of population growth 
1990–2000. Table A-2 provides the logistic regression results for the propensity score 
matching model. For several of the parcel-specific characteristics, we lacked a prior 
hypothesis, but we are somewhat surprised by coefficients indicating a higher probability 
of receiving an LIHTC project between 2001 and 2004 in the vicinity of Polk County 
single-family home parcels that in 1999 were newer, had larger lot sizes, greater living 
area, more bedrooms and/or were in better than normal condition, each trait holding other 
variables in the model constant, of course. On the other hand, coefficients indicating a 
higher probability for receiving a project as a neighbor among lower-valued homes, with 
fewer bathrooms and smaller or nonexistent attached garages, located on blocks with 
more minorities and a lower home ownership rate, and located in census tracts with lower 
median family incomes and higher individual poverty rates appears in line with what one 
might expect for the siting of low-income housing. 
 
Given the estimated coefficients β  in Table A-2 and the values of the variables x , we 
calculate the propensity scores by way of the logit link function 
 
 ( ) x
x
I β′
β′
+== e
ePr
1
1  
                                                 
19 For an example of the quasi-experimental approach applied to a job training 
program, see Dehejia, Rajeev H. and Sadek Wahba. (1999). “Causal Effects in 
Nonexperimental Studies: Reevaluating the Evaluation of Training Programs,” Journal of 
the American Statistical Association, 94, pp. 1053–1062.  For an example of a quasi-
experimental approach applied to an enterprise zone program, see O’Keefe, Suzanne. 
(2004). “Job Creation in California’s Enterprise Zones: A Comparison Using a 
Propensity Score Matching Model,” Journal of Urban Economics, 55, pp. 131–150. 
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Then for each parcel located within one-half mile of a project approved between 2001 
and 2004, we attempt to match a potential control parcel that has the closest propensity 
score to the treatment parcel, as calculated from the equation above. To accomplish this 
enormous search through nearly 100,000 records, we employed a 5-to-1 digit greedy 
matching algorithm. First, the algorithm attempts to match the treatment parcels to 
controls based on five digits of the propensity score. For those that did not match, cases 
are then matched to controls based on four digits of the propensity score. This continues 
down to a one-digit match on propensity score for those that remained unmatched. 
Therefore, the process ensures that “best” matches occur first, “second-best” matches 
next, and so on in a hierarchical sequence until no more matches can be made. Best 
matches are those with the highest digit match on propensity score; in other words, those 
that have the least absolute difference in propensity scores. 
 
Table A-1 provides descriptive statistics on each of the matching variables for the parcels 
near LIHTC projects, their matches, and all of Polk County. As one can see, the matching 
performed quite nicely in this instance. First, a match rate of 88 percent of treatment 
cases is fairly high compared to similar studies. Incomplete matching may result due to 
two reasons: cases have missing data or there are disjoint ranges of treatment and control 
propensity scores. Data must be complete for all covariates in the multiple logistic 
regression analysis used to calculate the propensity score. If any covariate data are 
missing or the raw value of a variable to be logged is zero, the case is eliminated from the 
analysis and a propensity score is not calculated. Incomplete matching will result and the 
cases with missing data will be excluded. Alternatively, the treatment cases and the 
controls may contain a disjoint range of propensity scores. Incomplete matching will 
result and the treatment cases with the highest propensity scores and the controls with the 
lowest propensity scores will be excluded. We found no significant differences between 
the 381 treatment cases excluded (for either reason) and the 2,902 that remain, so we 
anticipate no problems have been introduced to the analysis through case omission. A 
close inspection of the descriptive statistics variable by variable in Table A-1 
demonstrates how well the propensity score matching method selected controls with no 
meaningful difference from the treatment group in terms of central tendency or spread for 
any of the observable characteristics deemed important to home values. 
 
In addition to identifying the locations of the new LIHTC projects in Polk County, Map 
1.1 identifies the half-mile radius around each project and the locations of the control 
parcels. As the map emphasizes, many of the controls are located just beyond homes 
within the half-mile radius of a project. In fact, roughly half of all controls are in the 
yellow census blocks with very few controls, while the red and orange regions combined 
make up the other half. We believe this to be a strength of this analysis as it indicates we 
have some degree of assurance that controls are also in neighborhoods that are similar to 
their matched treatment cases. 
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EVALUATION MODELS 
This section describes each of the models displayed in Tables A-3 and A-4. Among these, 
we have the greatest confidence in the matched pair fixed effects models 6 and 8 in Table 
A-3. Ignoring for the moment the quasi-experimental approach developed in Equations 
(1) and (3), the simplest test of the effects of distance to any LIHTC project on the value 
of single-family properties is: 
 
 ( ) ( ) t,it,it,i uDTPValue +β+α= lnln 0  (Model 1) 
 
in which case we have a pooled regression of the four time periods and the current value 
of a single-family home is a function of only the current distance to the nearest LIHTC 
project t,iDTP . To construct this measure of nearest distance to a project, we assigned to 
every property as a 1999 baseline its straight-line distance to the nearest project approved 
between 1997 and 1998. The 2001 distance is then the minimum of distances to a project 
approved in 1999 and the 1999 baseline. That minimum then becomes the baseline for 
calculating nearest project distances for 2003 and so on. In that way, the distance to 
nearest project is at most the value of its length in 1999 and generally is getting shorter in 
subsequent years. Naturally, distances to nearest project for the treatment group are 
becoming shorter much quicker over time than for the control group. 
 
MATCHED PAIR FIXED EFFECTS MODELS 
Of course, one would expect that the value of a home is caused by many other 
consequential factors besides the proximity to LIHTC projects, so we would anticipate 
the coefficient β  above to be a biased estimator of the impact of projects on home values. 
Furthermore, the distance-to-project measure may be altogether inappropriate since there 
is no maximum threshold over which we might expect effects from proximity to occur. It 
is therefore somewhat surprising that when we pool our matched controls chosen from 
the propensity score method described above with the treatment cases, the coefficients on 
t,iDTP  for this model and that in model 2 test consistently with findings of project 
impacts in our better quasi-experimental models 6 and 8. Including a dummy variable for 
each of the 2,902 matched pairs in the equation for model 1 above allows each matched 
pair to have its own intercept and this is our approach in model 2. As one can see, this 
reduces the estimate of the impact of proximity to a project β , but it remains significantly 
different from zero. Because the functional form of these models is in double-log, the 
coefficients on covariates are elasticities. Thus, the interpretation of findings for model 2 
is that a home located twice as far from an LIHTC project as another is worth 
1.26 percent more than the home located half the distance to a project. 
 
Extending the approach in Equation (4), regressions with fixed effects for each matched 
pair of parcels provide estimates of the impact of LIHTC projects on single-family home 
valuation across all parcels, while controlling for the valuation that could have been 
expected in the absence of the project. These regressions take the form: 
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 ( ) ( ) t,iitt,it,ijit uValueValue +β+β+β+α= −1321 lnProjectProjectln 4-yr32-yr1  (model 4) 
 
where t  represents biennial observations coinciding with the equalization cycle, i  
indexes parcels, and j  indexes a matched pair composed of a parcel neighboring an 
LIHTC project and a non-neighbor from the same county. The project neighbor variable 
I ′  in Equation (3) is divided into two periods, 1 to 2 years since project approval and 3 to 
4 years after project approval, to estimate how property valuation effects may differ over 
time. Controlling for the home’s value last year, the coefficients of interest 1β  and 2β  
approximate the effect of the Low Income Housing Tax Credit project’s approval on 
single-family home valuation. Each of the matched pair fixed effects models also gives 
each neighborhood its own spatial fixed effect by including a dummy variable for every 
neighborhood that has one or more parcels (treatment or control) in the regression. 
 
Models 3, 5, 6, 7 and 8 have small but important variations from the basic form in model 
4 above and model 3 combines the 2-yr1Project t,i  and 
4-yr3Project t,i  variables into a single 
project neighbor variable similar to I ′  in Equation (3). In models 5 and 6, the two 
periodic project neighbor variables are divided further into three project types as 
discussed in Section One. In models 7 and 8, the project neighbor variable is divided into 
separate effects for each of the 13 individual project numbers (Note that 01-33, 02-02 and 
03-02 have been counted as the same project among the 11 mentioned earlier, but are 
treated individually here due to their different locations and different years of approval, 
bringing the actual number of projects to 13). Model 8 differs from model 7 in that the 
former also controls for the overlap (or interaction) that occurs when a home is located 
within a half-mile radius of more than one project. Also we should point out here that the 
project effects cannot be divided into the two time periods when the effects are separated 
into the 13 individual projects due to a redundancy that occurs over this relatively short 
time horizon. The project number indicates the year of approval so all information about 
the duration of the individual project’s effect is already contained when homes enter as 
treatment in period t . Model 6 differs from model 5 in respects similar to how model 8 
differs from model 7 and that regression takes the form: 
 ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) 6) (model                               ln                     
Type3Type1Type3Type1Type3Type1                     
Type3Type3Type2Type2Type1Type1ln
4-yr32-yr14-yr34-yr32-yr12-yr1
4-yr32-yr14-yr32-yr14-yr32-yr1
∑ ∑−
=
−
=
− +α+α+β+
×β+×β+×β+
β+β+β+β+β+β+α=
1
1
1
1
0110
987
654321
T
t
M
m
t,immtt,it
t,it,it,it,it,it,i
t,it,it,it,it,it,ijit
uNBHDYEARValue
Value
 
where the three terms on the second row of the equation for model 6 control for the 
interaction effects on all homes located within one-half mile of more than one project that 
has been approved (these are the only overlaps that actually occurred among our matches 
of treatment parcels and their controls); ∑−
=
α
1
1
0
T
t
tt, YEAR  are the two-year observed dummy 
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variables for 2001 and 2003 (2005 is the reference year and 1999 is lost due to the lagged 
assessed value on the right-hand side); and ∑−
=
α
1
1
M
m
mm NBHD  are the 1−M  neighborhood 
dummy variables for the spatial fixed effects. 
 
RANDOM GROWTH MODELS 
As an alternative to the matched pair fixed approach in models 3 through 8, we also 
tested random growth models in which we include fixed effects for every parcel and rely 
on variation in assessed values before and after the LIHTC projects were approved to 
give each parcel a separate linear growth trajectory.20 Returning to notation in Equation 
(1) the random growth rates model of Heckman and Hotz is designed to control for the 
possibility that stagnant or declining housing markets were targeted by the LIHTC 
approval process.21 That specification is given in the equation below 
 
 
( )
t,it,it,i
t,it,it,it,itiit,i YEARtValue
ε+δ+δ+
δ+δ+δ+δ+γ+β+α=
4-yr32-yr1
4-yr32-yr14-yr32-yr1
Type3Type3                     
Type2Type2Type1Type1ln
65
4321  
 
where the variables are defined the same as in model 6 although the value of the home in 
the previous year and other local characteristics captured by the neighborhood dummy 
variables are now omitted because they are either subsumed into each parcel’s time-
invariant fixed effect or are assumed to be orthogonal to the siting of the LIHTC projects. 
The unique intercept for each parcel is next introduced through first-differencing the 
equations, which yields: 
 
( )
13) (model                                                             Type3Type3                     
Type2Type2Type1Type1ln
,
4-yr3
,6
2-yr1
,5
4-yr3
,4
2-yr1
,3
4-yr3
,2
2-yr1
,1,
tititi
tititititiiti YEARValue
εδδ
δδδδγβ
Δ+Δ+Δ+
Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+Δ+=Δ
 
 
where iβ  is a parcel-specific effect, a unique component of the regression intercept for 
each parcel that controls how values differ across parcels. Since the equation contains this 
parcel-specific effect, it is estimated using deviations from means, a standard fixed 
                                                 
20 For discussions and applications of the random growth approach to testing for 
economic development effects in the case of enterprise zones, see Boarnet, Marlon G. 
(2001). “Enterprise Zones and Job Creation: Linking Evaluation and Practice,” Economic 
Development Quarterly, 15, pp. 242–254 and Boarnet, Marlon G. and William T. Bogart. 
(1996). “Enterprise Zones and Employment: Evidence from New Jersey,” Journal of 
Urban Economics, 40, pp. 198–215. 
21 See Heckman, J. and V. Holtz. (1989). “Choosing Among Alternative 
Nonexperimental Methods for Estimating the Impact of Social Programs: The Case of 
Manpower Training,” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 84, pp. 862–875. 
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effects technique for panel data estimation. The term ti YEARΔγ  accounts for differences 
in rates of valuation across parcels by allowing each parcel to have a unique linear 
growth rate. Thus, the regression for model 13 allows each parcel in the data set to have 
its own intercept (initial value) and its own linear growth rate. Conditional on those 
unique starting points and trajectories, the periodic project neighbor variables, 2-yr1Type1 t,i , 
4-yr3Type1 t,i , 
2-yr1Type2 t,i , . . ., 
4-yr3Type3 t,i , test the link between the sitting of Low Income 
Housing Tax Credit projects and the valuation of neighboring single-family homes. The 
strategy applies equally to the small but important variations in models 9, 10, 11, 12 and 
14. The results for regressions of these random growth models are reported in Table A-4 
following: 
 
 
 
Table A-1 
Descriptive statistics for single-family homes near LIHTC projects, matched homes and all 
Polk County homes in 1999 
Characteristic Homes near projects
Mean (st. dev.) 
Matched homes 
Mean (st. dev.) 
All Polk County homes
Mean (st. dev.) 
    
Property Characteristics (parcel & 
structure) 
   
    
Total assessed value ($) 59,664.28 
(45,688.62) 
60,363.90 
(41,017.72) 
101,277.77 
(71,674.43) 
Age (years) 68.02 
(33.59) 
67.04 
(32.51) 
50.42 
(27.28) 
Distance to state capitol (miles) 3.37 
(1.86) 
3.76 
(2.99) 
5.42 
(2.99) 
Land area (sq. ft) 12,095.24 
(17,155.43) 
13,485.66 
(28,100.81) 
15,429.08 
(31,139.13) 
Total living area (sq. ft.) 1,230.28 
(467.35) 
1,188.50 
(458.99) 
1,366.08 
(607.69) 
No. of bedrooms 2.85 
(0.79) 
2.79 
(0.80) 
2.86 
(0.79) 
No. of bathrooms 1.21 
(0.49) 
1.20 
(0.46) 
1.43 
(0.63) 
Basement area (sq. ft.) 751.54 
(349.42) 
739.66 
(371.40) 
922.48 
(433.74) 
Attached garage area (sq. ft.) 59.88 60.55 13.09 
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(175.72) (166.73) (26.09) 
Condition 
Very Poor 
Poor 
Below Normal 
Normal 
Above Normal 
Very Good 
Excellent 
 
0.007 
0.034 
0.138 
0.351 
0.316 
0.140 
0.014 
 
0.006 
0.035 
0.136 
0.350 
0.320 
0.139 
0.014 
 
0.001 
0.009 
0.052 
0.426 
0.357 
0.140 
0.014 
Exterior wall type 
Asbestos 
Brick 
Composition 
Concrete block 
Concrete board 
Frame plus brick 
Masonite 
Masonry 
Metal siding 
Mixed frame 
Stone 
Stucco 
Vinyl siding 
Wood siding 
Other 
 
0.050 
0.030 
0.015 
0.002 
0.000 
0.004 
0.193 
0.000 
0.269 
0.051 
0.000 
0.019 
0.120 
0.244 
0.002 
 
0.054 
0.036 
0.017 
0.001 
0.000 
0.004 
0.189 
0.000 
0.263 
0.053 
0.000 
0.016 
0.119 
0.244 
0.003 
 
0.026 
0.085 
0.003 
0.002 
0.001 
0.016 
0.305 
0.000 
0.224 
0.032 
0.000 
0.017 
0.100 
0.185 
0.003 
Foundation 
Brick 
Concrete block 
Masonry 
Pier 
Poured Concrete 
Stone 
Wood 
 
0.390 
0.239 
0.043 
0.001 
0.324 
0.000 
0.002 
 
0.346 
0.257 
0.052 
0.000 
0.342 
0.001 
0.001 
 
0.167 
0.484 
0.047 
0.001 
0.298 
0.001 
0.001 
Heating 
Electric forced air 
Floor wall 
 
0.003 
0.004 
 
0.004 
0.005 
 
0.011 
0.007 
  
 
84 
Gas forced air 
Geothermal 
Gravity hot air 
Heat pump 
Steam-heated water 
No heat 
0.966 
0.000 
0.009 
0.001 
0.015 
0.001 
0.969 
0.000 
0.010 
0.002 
0.010 
0.002 
0.958 
0.000 
0.005 
0.008 
0.011 
0.001 
    
Neighborhood Characteristics (census 
block) 
   
    
Minority population 35.45 
(39.12) 
33.90 
(49.50) 
13.09 
(26.09) 
Home ownership rate 0.712 
(0.248) 
0.731 
(0.227) 
0.847 
(0.189) 
Homeowner vacancy rate 0.017 
(0.043) 
0.017 
(0.038) 
0.012 
(0.034) 
    
Market Characteristics (census tract)    
    
Median family income 40,714.40 
(19,588.81) 
41,588.65 
(16,545.51) 
58,331.41 
(17,429.06) 
Population change 0.089 
(0.232) 
0.098 
(0.194) 
0.141 
(0.263) 
Poverty rate 0.183 
(0.107) 
0.173 
(0.114) 
0.072 
(0.059) 
    
Number of obs. 3,283 2,902 94,136 
 
Table A-2 
Logistic regression results. Estimated probabilities provide ‘propensity scores’ 
Variable Coefficient 
(std. error) 
1999 assessed value (ln) -1.36910 
(0.06480)* 
Age (ln) -0.41530 
(0.05680)* 
Distance to state capitol (ln) 0.88130 
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(0.05400)* 
Land area (ln) 0.34890 
(0.03710)* 
Living area (ln) 0.57450 
(0.09970)* 
No. of bedrooms 0.24820 
(0.03490)* 
No. of bathrooms -0.15300 
(0.05800)* 
Basement area (sq. ft.) 0.00002 
(0.00006) 
Attached garage area (sq. ft.) -0.00100 
(0.00016)* 
Condition (reference = ‘Normal’) 
Very Poor 
 
Poor 
 
Below Normal 
 
Above Normal 
 
Very Good 
 
Excellent 
 
 
-0.53820 
(0.28820) 
-0.33270 
(0.12960)* 
-0.15630 
(0.07960)* 
0.18520 
(0.06990)* 
0.56720 
(0.07900)* 
0.51260 
(0.16730)* 
Exterior wall type (reference = ‘Masonite’) 
Asbestos 
 
Brick 
 
Composition 
 
Concrete block 
 
Concrete board 
 
0.11670 
(0.16840) 
-0.43840 
(0.17520)* 
0.42140 
(0.23280) 
-0.56380 
(0.45370) 
-1.10580 
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Frame plus brick 
 
Masonry 
 
Metal siding 
 
Mixed frame 
 
Stone 
 
Stucco 
 
Vinyl siding 
 
Wood siding 
 
Other 
(0.95850) 
-1.06910 
(0.33150)* 
-0.44840 
(1.07240) 
0.12200 
(0.14460) 
0.28860 
(0.16630) 
2.81520 
(1.12920)* 
-0.27130 
(0.19900) 
-0.18340 
(0.15160) 
0.23820 
(0.14540) 
0.05540 
(0.39090) 
Foundation (reference = ‘Concrete block’) 
Brick 
 
Masonry 
 
Pier 
 
Poured Concrete 
 
Stone 
 
Wood 
 
0.04450 
(0.19650) 
-0.38480 
(0.20920) 
-0.37560 
(0.55280) 
1.09120 
(0.19240)* 
-1.09150 
(0.89060) 
0.70180 
(0.50120) 
Heating (reference = ‘Gas forced air’) 
Electric forced air 
 
Floor wall 
 
0.53910 
(13.07390) 
0.17470 
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Geothermal 
 
Gravity hot air 
 
Heat pump 
 
Steam-heated water 
 
No heat 
(13.07270) 
-4.31050 
(91.48760) 
1.17660 
(13.07170) 
0.16730 
(13.07990) 
1.62360 
(13.07130) 
-0.85760 
(13.07970) 
Census block minority population in 2000 0.00308 
(0.00057)* 
Census block home ownership rate in 2000 -0.89250 
(0.10410)* 
Census block homeowner vacancy rate in 2000 -1.67540 
(0.56270)* 
Census tract median family income in 2000 (thousands) -0.00951 
(0.00305)* 
Census tract population change 1990 – 2000 (%) 0.00158 
(0.00128) 
Census tract individual poverty rate in 2000 (%) 0.15410 
(0.00461)* 
  
Log likelihood -9,646.77 
Pseudo R-squared 0.331 
Number of obs. 91,006 
 
 
Table A-3 
Impact of LIHTC project locations on single-family home valuation (dependent variable is log of assessed value) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
Distance to project (ln) 0.03738 
(0.00249)* 
0.01359 
(0.00266)* 
      
Project neighbor   0.00108 
(0.00453) 
     
1–2 years since    -0.00406     
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
approval (0.00416) 
3–4 years since 
approval 
   -0.00250 
(0.00611) 
    
Type One 1–2 years 
since approval 
    -0.04911 
(0.00575)* 
-0.03841 
(0.00631)* 
  
Type One 3–4 years      0.00497 
(0.00704) 
0.00848 
(0.00727) 
  
Type Two 1–2 years 
since approval 
    -0.01108 
(0.01611) 
-0.00844 
(0.01610) 
  
Type Two 3–4 years      0.07802 
(0.02341)* 
0.08571 
(0.02341)* 
  
Type Three 1–2 years 
since approval 
    0.02944 
(0.00557)* 
0.05163 
(0.00645)* 
  
Type Three 3–4 years     0.00086 
(0.01045) 
0.02827 
(0.02580) 
  
Type 1 (1–2 Years) X 
Type 3 (1–2 Years) 
     -0.08320 
(0.01267)* 
  
Type 1 (3–4 Years) X 
Type 3 (3–4 Years) 
     -0.05103 
(0.02803) 
  
Type 1 (1–2 Years) X 
Type 3 (3–4 Years) 
     0.03418 
(0.02339) 
  
Project 01-25       -0.09481 
(0.07495) 
-0.12548 
(0.08553) 
Project 01-33       -0.00721 
(0.01788) 
0.01935 
(0.03446) 
Project 02-02       -0.02925 
(0.01751) 
-0.02448 
(0.03403) 
Project 02-19       0.07577 
(0.02116)* 
0.07541 
(0.02116)* 
Project 02-28       -0.00794 
(0.01161) 
0.03456 
(0.02137) 
Project 02-29       -0.02280 
(0.01090)* 
-0.03120 
(0.02120) 
Project 02-30       -0.00971 -0.01022 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
(0.01230) (0.01232) 
Project 03-02       0.00798 
(0.00892) 
-0.03698 
(0.02559) 
Project 03-24       -0.14368 
(0.06981)* 
-0.19330 
(0.09339)* 
Project 04-23       0.07062 
(0.00715)* 
0.06988 
(0.00718)* 
Project 04-30       -0.03018 
(0.02616) 
-0.03787 
(0.02776) 
Project 04-33       -0.04309 
(0.01209)* 
-0.04490 
(0.01227)* 
Project 04-49       -0.06738 
(0.03269) 
-0.08093 
(0.03628)* 
01-25 X 03-24        0.11196 
(0.14040) 
01-33 X 02-02        -0.03485 
(0.04874) 
01-33 X 02-28        0.03325 
(0.09657) 
01-33 X 02-29        -0.03311 
(0.09677) 
01-33 X 03-02        -0.02201 
(0.04922) 
02-02 X 02-28        -0.07151 
(0.09677) 
02-02 X 02-29        0.05422 
(0.09721) 
02-02 X 03-02        0.06293 
(0.04347) 
02-28 X 02-29        -0.03705 
(0.03047) 
02-28 X 03-02        0.02893 
(0.03223) 
02-29 X 03-02        0.02556 
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Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 
         
(0.02420) 
04-23 X 04-33        0.05836 
(0.07549) 
04-30 X 04-49        0.06851 
(0.08266) 
Assessed value last year 
(ln) 
0.94170 
(0.00238)* 
0.70868 
(0.00485)* 
0.70845 
(0.00485)* 
0.70833 
(0.00487)* 
0.70662 
(0.00486)* 
0.70683 
(0.00485)* 
0.70617 
(0.00484)* 
0.70629 
(0.00484)* 
Year observed dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matched pair dummies No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Neighborhood dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Adj. R-Squared 0.9160 0.9167 0.9263 0.9263 0.9268 0.9270 0.9272 0.9273 
Observations 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 
 
 
Table A-4 
Random Growth Models (dependent variable is log of assessed value) 
Variable Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model13 Model 14 
       
Distance to project 
(ln) 
0.00108 
(0.00230) 
     
Project neighbor  -0.01045 
(0.00384)* 
    
1-2 years since 
approval 
  -0.00715 
(0.00416) 
   
3-4 years since 
approval 
  0.01562 
(0.00811) 
   
Type One    -0.04933 
(0.00605)* 
  
1-2 years since 
approval 
    -0.04352 
(0.00570)* 
 
3-4 years      -0.01349 
(0.00848) 
 
Type Two    -0.03465 
(0.01494) 
  
1-2 years since     -0.02051  
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Variable Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model13 Model 14 
       
approval (0.01610) 
3-4 years      0.02817 
(0.03242) 
 
Type Three    0.01730 
(0.00532)* 
  
1-2 years since 
approval 
    0.02290 
(0.00569)* 
 
3-4 years     0.03238 
(0.01335)* 
 
Project 01-25      -0.23288 
(0.09263)* 
Project 01-33      0.01437 
(0.02290) 
Project 02-02      -0.04973 
(0.02260)* 
Project 02-19      -0.00917 
(0.02106) 
Project 02-28      -0.00306 
(0.01457) 
Project 02-29      -0.04883 
(0.01368)* 
Project 02-30      -0.02555 
(0.01190)* 
Project 03-02      -0.01498 
(0.00867) 
Project 03-24      -0.39591 
(0.06908)* 
Project 04-23      0.05704 
(0.00708)* 
Project 04-30      -0.05699 
(0.02617)* 
Project 04-33      -0.06503 
(0.01219)* 
Project 04-49      -0.05030 
  
 
92 
Variable Model 9 Model 10 Model 11 Model 12 Model13 Model 14 
       
(0.03348) 
Year observed 
dummies 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Matched pair 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
Neighborhood 
dummies 
No No No No No No 
Adj. R-Squared 0.0099 0.0103 0.0112 0.0138 0.0149 0.0215 
Observations 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 17,412 
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APPENDIX B: ASSESSING THE SOCIAL IMPACTS OF HOUSING SUBSIDIES  
 
In addition to the impacts that housing subsidies have on property markets and on local 
and state economies, subsidies have other less easily measured, but nevertheless 
important impacts. This was not an initial focus of this study, but we believed it would be 
helpful to review the academic literature on the relationship between housing quality, 
short- and long-term health and educational outcomes. Most of the studies we identified 
deal with children, but a few address these relationships for adults too. 
 
HOUSING AND HEALTH 
There are three main ways in which housing affects health. The physical characteristics 
and quality of homes produce environmental effects that may result in health problems, 
such as allergies or injuries. Unstable housing may affect access to health care and may 
also have mental health effects. High housing costs may affect how much the household 
spends on other essential items such as nutrition and health care, which may result in 
health problems.  
 
HOUSING QUALITY AND ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACTS 
Our homes are the indoor environments in which we spend a majority of our time. 
Substandard housing can result in a wide range of environmental contaminants and other 
dangers (Breysse et al. 2004). Two of the most prevalent illnesses are asthma and lead 
poisoning. Poorly maintained housing may have water leaks and harbor pests that can 
trigger allergies (allergic asthma) to mold, pests and other environmental contaminants. It 
is estimated that approximately 80% of childhood asthma is an allergic reaction to indoor 
environmental triggers such as dust, mold and pests (Breysse et al. 2004). Asthma affects 
approximately one in five children in poor neighborhoods (Proscio 2004). Housing with 
exposed lead paint can cause developmental disabilities in children who breathe in 
contaminated dust. Among six-year-olds tested in Iowa in 2005, nearly 7% (1,584) of 
children were affected by lead poisoning (Iowa Department of Public Health, 2006).  
 
Furnaces in poor condition can increase carbon dioxide to dangerous levels. Homes with 
basement cracks can expose residents to higher levels of radon. Homes without adequate 
smoke alarms, fire retardant materials, safe wiring and fire escapes increase the danger of 
injury and death from home fires. Many physical components, such as poorly lit stairs, 
unstable railings and numerous other features increase the risk of other injuries (Krieger 
and Higgins 2002). Even well-maintained homes can pose environmental dangers from 
chemical compounds used in wall and floor finishes, or exposure to passive smoking; but 
adequate ventilation can diminish these dangers. While building codes and other 
regulations should deal with some of these problems, they do not address all and are not 
uniformly enforced, especially in low-priced rental housing.  
 
An assessment of the total annual costs for childhood diseases attributable to 
environmental factors estimates this at $54.9 billion across the U.S. in 1997 (Landrigen et 
al. 2002). The bulk of this amount ($43.4 billion) was attributable to lifetime earnings 
loss to children with lead poisoning, but other environmentally attributed childhood 
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illnesses (asthma, cancer and neuro-behavioral disorders such as mental retardation, 
autism and cerebral palsy) imposed substantial financial costs as well. Together, these 
costs account for approximately 2.8% of all disease-related costs in the U.S. In 
comparison, the nationwide annual costs of vehicle accidents is $80.6 billion, and of 
strokes, $51.5 billion. These estimates include only financial costs of lost earnings, health 
care and hospitalizations, not the emotional costs of disease or the long-term 
consequences that childhood illness has on adult health and well-being. Poor quality 
housing has a significant impact then on the costs of children’s health care, and perhaps 
more importantly on the quality of life that children in substandard housing can attain.  
       
UNSTABLE HOUSING AND HEALTH INDICATORS 
 “Housing instability” is a concept that differentiates people who are not homeless from 
those who have stable, permanent housing. People in unstable housing include those 
paying more than 50% of their income (the severely cost-burdened), those who move 
frequently (three or more times each year), those living in overcrowded conditions, and 
those living doubled up with family or friends. It may be similar to the concept of the 
“near-homeless.”  
 
For adults, there is a strong statistical association between living in unstable housing and 
increased emergency room use and hospitalizations. As we might expect, people living in 
unstable housing are less likely to have a usual source of medical care and more likely to 
postpone medical visits and the purchase of medications (Kushel et al. 2006). Those 
living in crowded housing (and especially those in the overcrowded conditions of most 
homeless shelters) are significantly more likely to suffer from diseases like tuberculosis 
and respiratory infections (Krieger and Higgens 2002). Crowding has also been found to 
be associated with sleep deprivation and psychological distress. Frequent moves have 
been found to be associated with socio-emotional development problems in children and 
may result in psychological damage (Bronfenbrenner and Evans 2000; Bartlett 1998).  
 
HIGH HOUSING COSTS AND HEALTH EFFECTS 
Lower-income households who pay a significant share of their income for housing have 
less to spend on other necessities. Chart B.1 compares spending on several basic budget 
items for very low- and low-income households who spend more than 50% of income for 
housing and those in the same income categories who spend less than 30% of their 
income for housing. Very low-income households with high-housing cost burdens spend 
much less on food and nothing on health care, compared to equivalent low-income 
households with affordable housing (Joint Center for Housing Studies 2006).  
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Chart B.1: Expenditures for Households in the Lowest-Income Quartile, 2003, by Housing Outlays 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: High-housing outlays account for more than 50% of household income; households with low outlays 
pay no more than 30% of income for housing. Source: Joint Center for Housing Studies 2006. 
 
Other researchers have found significant differences in children’s nutrition among 
extremely poor households: children in extremely poor families living in subsidized 
housing were far less likely to be underweight for their age than children in equally poor 
families without housing assistance (Meyers et al. 2005). This effect persists even after 
controlling for receipt of other assistance, such as WIC or food stamps. Children who are 
underweight are more likely to suffer from several health and learning problems. They 
are more vulnerable to infection and more likely to show delayed mental development 
and reduced intellectual capacity (Meyer et al. 2005). These effects impose additional 
costs on the public health care and school systems.  
 
HOUSING AND EDUCATION 
If housing quality and affordability affect health, especially for children, we may expect 
that they affect children’s educational performance too. School days lost to asthma and 
infections, neuro-behavioral disorders from environmental contaminants, and the longer-
term effects of undernourishment and lead poisoning on reduced intellectual capacity, all 
impact a child’s educational achievement. In addition, several studies have examined the 
relationship between school mobility and educational outcomes. Not all of those studies 
separate out the effects of changing schools frequently from the effects of being low 
income, and the two are obviously intertwined.   
 
A GAO study in 1994 found that 17% of third-grade children had attended three or more 
schools. Children who had moved that frequently were far more likely to score below 
grade level on both reading (41% of frequent movers compared to 26% of those who 
didn’t move) and math (33% of recent movers compared to 17% of those who didn’t 
move) (GAO 1994).  
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And, children from low-income families were far more likely to move frequently; 30% of 
third-grade children in low-income families had attended three or more schools.  
 
This burdens schools, especially those with more children who move frequently, and may 
affect the ability of schools to meet academic standards (Hartman 2006). Others have 
found a relationship between frequent moves and greater likelihood of behavioral 
problems that lead to suspension (Engec 2006). Longitudinal studies that track children 
over time have shown a strong association between mobility and not completing or 
graduating from high school (Rumberger and Larson 1988; Swanson and Schneider 
1999).  
 
However, not all studies have controlled for other important sources of variation in 
children’s academic achievement. Low family incomes may expose children to many 
other reasons for poor school performance, in addition to being far more likely to move 
frequently than others. A recent study controlled for the effects of income and early 
achievement. That study found that changing schools frequently before the third grade 
resulted in significantly lower reading and math scores among sixth-grade children. It 
was also significantly associated with the likelihood of being held back at least one grade 
(Heinlein and Schinn 2000). Because the study controlled not only for socio-economic 
status but also for the student’s early achievement (which may be affected by some of the 
environmental factors described above, as well as the home learning environment and 
other potentially confounding variables), it may offer a more solid piece of evidence for 
the effect residential mobility has on educational outcomes. Other studies that have 
controlled for family characteristics have also found a significant association between 
mobility and educational achievement and high school graduation rates (Haveman and 
Wolfe 1994; Mao, Whitset and Mellor 1997). However, some studies have concluded 
that mobility is merely one among several influential factors in predicting test 
performance (Wright 1999; Parades 1993; Tucker, Marx and Long 1998). School quality, 
parental involvement, family structure and other factors may matter more. Nevertheless, 
residential mobility is a factor affecting performance. 
     
But to what extent is school mobility a voluntary choice? Mobility can be a way for a 
family to improve its circumstances, by pursuing a better paying job for instance. A 
recent study of student mobility in rural upstate New York found that a high proportion 
of school moves were caused by “push”(where the family had no choice but to move) 
rather than “pull” factors. In this low-income rural setting (not dissimilar to parts of 
Iowa), housing factors overall accounted for 72% of moves, with the remainder 
attributable to moves related to employment or family restructuring. Housing “push” 
factors, such as eviction, moving out of temporary housing, moving on from a temporary 
stay with a family or friend, or moving to find cheaper housing, accounted for 62% of all 
moves (Schaft 2006).  
               
Thus, there is a reasonable amount of evidence that housing instability related to 
problems with housing affordability, quality and the rising incidence of near-
homelessness among families has damaging effects on both children’s educational 
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achievement and the burden placed on schools to accommodate children who are forced 
to move frequently. In most cases, these moves are not the parents’ choice (in Schaft’s 
study, parents interviewed were aware of the damaging effects that moves had on their 
children’s schooling), but are an outcome of their battle to find stable, decent, affordable 
housing.  
 
Chart B.2: Estimated Number of Iowa Families with Housing Problems, 2000 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
While it is possible to estimate some of the public costs resulting from housing 
instability, not all impacts are quantifiable. The social and individual consequences of 
poor school performance or chronic poor health are immense. In schools, teachers may be 
overburdened by dealing with the multiple problems some students face and the quality 
of education may be diminished for all students. Chronic health problems are often 
related to behavior problems that may diminish quality of life for many others beyond the 
victim, in addition to the costs they impose on a health insurance system that is already 
under strain. While this discussion does not explicitly estimate the incidence of these 
problems in Iowa, the first report issued on this study (Meeting Housing Challenges, 
2005) provides perspective on how many households and families may be affected. Chart 
B.2 shows the estimated numbers of families in Iowa with one or more severe housing 
problems. It is reasonable to assume that many of the children in these families may face 
one or more of the problems identified above.  
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The Iowa Department of Education provided data on the number of times elementary 
school-age children in Iowa moved schools from Fall 2004 to Fall 2006. Map B.1 shows 
the proportion of children who moved three or more times over that period. In a few 
counties, frequent moves are likely to affect a significant proportion of children. We have 
no information on the socio-economic status of those children or the reasons for these 
moves, but to the extent that more stable housing could avoid some share of these moves, 
the experiences of children (and teachers) could be improved. 
 
    
Map B.1: Percent of Elementary School Children with Frequent School Moves, 
Fall 2004 to Fall 2006 
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